Law Commons^™

Addressing The Class Claim Conundrum With Online Dispute Resolution, Amy J. Schmitz

Faculty Publications

Consumers with similar claims in the United States (U.S.) often join forces to launch representative, or "class", actions. This allows them to obtain remedies with little cost and effort and serves a "private attorney general" function by bringing light to purchase problems that public enforcement offices may not have the resources to address. This is especially important for lower dollar claims that are too costly for each consumer to pursue individually.

Nonetheless, some have criticized class actions in the U.S. for forcing settlements and padding the pockets of lawyers, while leaving consumers with minimal pay outs. At the same time, …

A Sour Battle In Lago Agrio And Beyond: The Metamorphosis Of Transnational Litigation And The Protection Of Collective Rights In Ecuador, Manuel A. Gomez

Faculty Publications

This article intends to explore the interplay between different dispute processing mechanisms and fora in the realm of transnational litigation, through the lens of the Chevron-Ecuador legal saga. My goal is to discuss the transformation of a transnational complex case and the challenges faced by the parties, their procedural strategies, and the perceived advantages of the different mechanisms. In this regard, I will also address the development of mechanisms for the protection of diffuse rights involving the environment; the role of the courts in supervising compliance with judicial remedies, their engagement in activities that go beyond their traditional role as …

Mass Procedures As A Form Of "Regulatory Arbitration" - Abaclat V. Argentine Republic And The International Investment Regime, S. I. Strong

Faculty Publications

This article takes a unique and intriguing look at the issues presented by Abaclat, considering the legitimacy of mass procedures from a regulatory perspective and using new governance theory to determine whether a new form of regulatory arbitration is currently being developed. In so doing, the discussion describes the basic parameters of regulatory litigation and analyzes the special problems that arise when regulatory litigation is used in the transnational context, then transfers those concepts into the arbitral realm. This sort of analysis, which is entirely novel as a matter of either public or private law, will shape future inquiries regarding …

Setting Attorneys' Fees In Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino, Charles Silver

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In 1995, Congress overrode President Bill Clinton's veto and enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a key purpose of which was to put securities class actions under the control of institutional investors with large financial stakes in the outcome of the litigation. The theory behind this policy, set out in a famous article by Professors Elliot Weiss and John Beckerman, was simple: self-interest should encourage investors with large stakes to run class actions in ways that maximize recoveries for all investors. These investors should naturally want to hire good lawyers, incentivize them properly, monitor their actions, and …

Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …

Fraud And Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes Of Action, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

The passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has engendered a significant forum shift in class action securities fraud litigation, from federal to state court. This unintended by-product of the Act has reignited debate over our dual federal-state system of securities regulation and in turn has inspired a discussion as to whether Congress should now preempt state securities fraud causes of action. This article argues that preemption is an appropriate, but not the only, solution to these concerns. To support this argument, this article first traces the history of dual state-federal securities regulation within the context of …

Class Action Chaos? The Theory Of The Core And An Analysis Of Opt-Out Rights In Mass Tort Class Actions, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

From breast implants to cigarettes, mass tort class actions are a prominent and controversial part of the contemporary litigation landscape. A critical component of these actions is the ability of class members to “opt out” and thereby exclude themselves from the effect of any class judgment. The tension between individual autonomy and the desire for global resolution of mass controversies has led to an intense debate concerning the circumstances under which opt-out rights should be constrained, if at all.

This Article makes five distinct contributions to the class action literature. First, the Article applies the game theoretic concept of the …

The Pentium Papers: A Case Study Of Collective Institutional Investor Activism In Litigation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

This article suggests that institutional investors have rational incentives to become more active in the litigation arena, but that the current debate is falsely constrained because it rests on the assumption that institutional investors must participate either by (1) assuming the formal role of lead plaintiff, class representative, or intervenor or, (2) not participating at all. This is a false dichotomy because, as this article demonstrates, institutions have available to them a rich array of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms by which they can make their views known to litigants and courts alike.

Our hypothesis that institutional investor activism …