Law Commons^™

The Use And Misuse Of Disclosure As A Regulatory System, Paula J. Dalley

ExpressO

Over the past several decades, legislators and regulators have increasingly turned to disclosure schemes, rather than substantive regulation, to accomplish regulatory goals. Most of these schemes are either expressly or impliedly based on the disclosure-based regulatory system established by the securities acts, which is primarily intended to provide information to traders in an established market and thereby to enhance the operation of the market. A secondary purpose of the securities acts is to alter the behavior of firms and individuals through the operation of the market. Other disclosure schemes usually have similar purposes, but they rarely operate in a market …

Saving Trade Secret Disclosures On The Internet Through Sequential Preservation, Elizabeth A. Rowe

ExpressO

When a trade secret is stolen from its owner and posted on the Internet, the default rule is that it becomes a free for all. By virtue of the fact that it has been posted, it becomes public, and consequently loses its trade secret protection. The ensuing result is that independent third parties, including competitors, are entitled to use it, and the trade secret owner, despite years of laudable efforts to maintain the secret, suffers a fatal loss at the hands of a wrongdoer. The apparent injustice in that conclusion does not go unnoticed.

Given that trade secret law is …

Why Do We Know What We Know? Reevaluating The Economic Case Against Pre-Contractual Disclosure Duties And For Break-Up Fees, Barak Medina, Ofer Grosskopf

ExpressO

The economic analysis of contract law offers influential arguments against pre-contractual disclosure duties and for break-up fees, based on the presumption that pre-contractual duties are (or should be) set to provide sufficient incentives to optimally invest in acquiring information at the negotiation stage. We suggest, however, that the existing analysis is flawed, since it overlooks an important incentive for investing in information gathering.

According to the conventional wisdom, a negotiating party will be motivated to invest resources in information gathering only on the basis of its expectation to extract the contractual surplus that the investment may generate. As a result, …