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Full-Text Articles in Law

Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson Feb 2013

Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

Between the Civil War and World War II, every state and the federal government shifted toward codified versions of their statutes. Academia has so far ignored the systemic effects of this dramatic change. For example, the consensus view in the academic literature about rules and standards has been that precise rules present higher enactment costs for legislatures than would general standards, while vague standards present higher information costs for courts and citizens than do rules. Systematic codification – featuring hierarchical format and numbering, topical arrangement, and cross-references – inverts this relationship, lowering transaction costs for legislatures and increasing information costs …


Fcpa Sanctions: Too Big To Debar?, Dru Stevenson Apr 2011

Fcpa Sanctions: Too Big To Debar?, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes bribery of foreign government officials; enforcement actions against corporations under the FCPA have been increasingly significantly in the last few years. There is an ongoing problem, however, with the sanctions for FCPA violations: enforcement agencies (DOJ and SEC) have limited themselves to fines, civil penalties, and occasional imprisonment of individual violators. Debarment from future federal government contracts, even temporarily, is an unused sanction for FCPA violations, even though Congress provided for this punishment by statute. Debarment would be a far more potent deterrent than fines and penalties, if the government were serious about …


Jury Selection And The Coase Theorem, Dru Stevenson Mar 2011

Jury Selection And The Coase Theorem, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

The thesis of this article is that jury selection is unique among the components of the litigation process, in that zero negotiation or bargaining occurs between the parties over the substantive or procedural events that unfold – despite the absence of any prohibitions on such negotiation. This lack of bargaining is particularly striking given that the litigants are in the same room, where they could discuss things face to face. Negotiation, whether over the ultimate outcome or over specific issues within the case, pervades every other segment of litigation, from the pre-filing phase until after the verdict. It is therefore …


Entrapment And Terrorism, Dru Stevenson Mar 2007

Entrapment And Terrorism, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

The thesis of this article is that the unique nature of terrorist crime requires a tweaking of the entrapment rules. The entrapment defense is our legal system’s primary mechanism for regulating government sting operations. I argue that sting operations and surveillance are conceptually distinct (or rival) methods of law enforcement, which compete for resource allocation. If an enforcement agency favors one method, it shifts resources away from the other. To the extent that we dislike panoptic government surveillance, we can steer enforcement agencies away from it by encouraging targeted stings; and we can achieve this, in part, by adapting the …