Law Commons^™

Associations And The Constitution: Four Questions About Four Freedoms, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When should a constitutional democracy allow private associations to discriminate? That question has become prominent once again, not only in the United States but abroad as well. John Inazu provides a provocative answer in his impressive Article, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty. According to his proposal, “strong pluralism,” associations should have a constitutional right to limit membership on any ground, including race. Strong pluralism articulates only three limits: It does not apply to the government, to commercial entities, or to monopolistic groups. In this Response, I raise four questions about Four Freedoms. First, I ask why …

Speech Engines, James Grimmelmann

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Academic and regulatory debates about Google are dominated by two opposing theories of what search engines are and how law should treat them. Some describe search engines as passive, neutral conduits for websites’ speech; others describe them as active, opinionated editors: speakers in their own right. The conduit and editor theories give dramatically different policy prescriptions in areas ranging from antitrust to copyright. But they both systematically discount search users’ agency, regarding users merely as passive audiences.

A better theory is that search engines are not primarily conduits or editors, but advisors. They help users achieve their diverse and individualized …

The End Of Religious Freedom: What Is At Stake?, Nelson Tebbe

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In recent work, Steven Smith argues that the American tradition of religious freedom is newly imperiled and may even be nearing exhaustion. This Review puts to one side the substance of that argument and focuses instead on what the stakes might be, should it turn out to be correct. It concludes that the consequences would not be as severe as many people fear.

Religious Exceptionalism And Human Rights, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The liberal-democratic governmental compact assures that citizenship, political power, and civic participation in all of its forms will be afforded to all citizens on an equal basis. In particular, simple identity—as a presumptive matter—cannot be the basis for the denial of human rights. It is on this simple yet elegant principle that all civil-rights laws are founded.

Freedom of religion presents a particularly complex problem in this context. On the one hand, it is—itself—a universally recognized member of the human rights family, and is protected under civil-rights laws. On the other hand, it is— because of its possible invocation by …