Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Condemning Religion: Rluipa And The Politics Of Eminent Domain, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Condemning Religion: Rluipa And The Politics Of Eminent Domain, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Should religious landowners enjoy special protection from eminent domain? A recent federal statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), compels courts to apply a compelling interest test to zoning and landmarking regulations that substantially burden religiously owned property. That provision has been controversial in itself, but today a new cutting-edge issue is emerging: whether the Act’s extraordinary protection should extend to condemnation as well. The matter has taken on added significance in the wake of Kelo, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its expansive view of the eminent domain power. In this Article, we argue that RLUIPA should …
Privatizing And Publicizing Speech, Nelson Tebbe
Privatizing And Publicizing Speech, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
When and how should governments be permitted to use private-law mechanisms to manage their public-law obligations? This short piece poses that question in the context of Summum, which the Supreme Court decided earlier this year, and Buono, which it will hear in the fall. In both cases, the government manipulated formal property rules in order to fend off constitutional challenges. In Summum, the government took ownership of a religious symbol in the face of a free speech challenge, while in Buono it shed ownership of land containing another sectarian symbol in an effort to moot an Establishment Clause problem. Although …
Excluding Religion: A Reply, Nelson Tebbe
Excluding Religion: A Reply, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This short piece replies to three prominent scholars who have offered thoughtful responses to my article, Excluding Religion. It first takes up their invitation to explore some of the ramifications of the article for legal and political theory, albeit in a limited way. Second, it revisits the article’s central argument - namely, that governments ought to have greater constitutional leeway to deny aid to religious actors and entities than is commonly thought - and shows how that proposal emerges from the conversation intact. Third, the reply defends certain limits on the practice of excluding religion, particularly the presumptive prohibition on …