Law Commons^™

Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference For Landownership In Regulatory Takings Law, Eduardo M. Peñalver

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article critiques the Court's attempt to cabin the Lucas "per se" takings rule by limiting it to real property. It argues that the distinction between real and personal property cannot be justified by history or the differing expectations of property owners. It then applies five theoretical frameworks (libertarian, personhood, utilitarian, public choice, and Thomistic-Aristotelian natural law) and finds that none of them supports the jurisprudential distinction between real and personal property. As a result, the article argues that "because the distinction between personal and real property is an unprincipled one, it cannot save the Court from the unpalatable implications …

Tahoe's Requiem: The Death Of The Scalian View Of Property And Justice, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Ten Years Of Takings, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No area of property law has been more controversial in the past decade than takings. No aspect of constitutional law more sharply poses the dilemma about the legitimate powers of the regulatory state than the just compensation question. No question concerning constitutional property is more intractable than what sorts of government regulatory actions constitute uncompensated "takings" of private property.

Limitations of space, not to mention my own ambivalence about many of the issues, prevent me from developing a complete normative theory of the proper scope of the Takings Clause. My aim here is vastly more modest: to outline the basic …