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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
Unitary Innovations And Political Accountability, Edward H. Stiglitz
Unitary Innovations And Political Accountability, Edward H. Stiglitz
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
An important trend in administrative and constitutional law is to attempt to concentrate ever-greater control over the administrative state in the hands of the President. As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, one foundation for this doctrinal trend is a fear that diffusing power diffuses accountability. Here, I study whether institutional innovations resulting from such judicial decisions support this functionalist constitutional value of political accountability, emphasizing under-appreciated complications arising out of interbranch relations. For most of the Article, I conduct an indepth empirical case study of the legislative veto, one …
Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, Edward H. Stiglitz
Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, Edward H. Stiglitz
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Under a common view, the administrative state inherits democratic legitimacy from the President, an individual who is envisioned both to control administrative agencies and to be electorally accountable. Presidents' administrations continue issuing rules, however, even after Presidents lose elections. Conventional wisdom holds that Presidents use the "midnight" period of their administrations-the period between the election and the inauguration of the next President-to issue unpopular and controversial rules. Many regard this midnight regulatory activity as democratically illegitimate. Yet we have scant evidence that presidential administrations in fact issue controversial or unpopular rules during the midnight period. In this Article, I examine …
Whose Secrets?, Josh Chafetz
Who Decides On Security?, Aziz Rana
Who Decides On Security?, Aziz Rana
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Despite over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of security arrangements in the United States has been toward greater—not less— executive centralization and discretion. This Article explores why efforts to curb presidential prerogative have failed so consistently. It argues that while constitutional scholars have overwhelmingly focused their attention on procedural solutions, the underlying reason for the growth of emergency powers is ultimately political rather than purely legal. In particular, scholars have ignored how the basic meaning of "security" has itself shifted dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War in line with changing ideas …
Hope In The Law, Annelise Riles
Hope In The Law, Annelise Riles
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination Of Executive Branch Justice, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination Of Executive Branch Justice, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.
Debate, Implicit Race Bias And The 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About Nothing?, Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Richard A. Epstein
Debate, Implicit Race Bias And The 2008 Presidential Election: Much Ado About Nothing?, Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Richard A. Epstein
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The election of Barack Obama marks a significant milestone for race relations in our nation—on this much our debaters agree. The meaning of this milestone for the future of race-based policies, such as affirmative action and antidiscrimination laws, is where they disagree. Dr. Gregory Parks and Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski argue that any announcement of the arrival of a “post-racial America” is premature, as the presidential campaign actually revealed an implicit racial bias present in “most white adult brains.” The stereotypical criticisms of Obama, explicit racial references by supporters of opposing candidates, and “deeply racially stratified voting” were, in fact, “reflection[s] …
Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison
Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme …
Ending Welfare, Leaving The Poor To Face New Risk, Jeffrey S. Lehman, Sheldon Danziger
Ending Welfare, Leaving The Poor To Face New Risk, Jeffrey S. Lehman, Sheldon Danziger
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Many Contexts Of Welfare Reform, Jeffrey S. Lehman
The Many Contexts Of Welfare Reform, Jeffrey S. Lehman
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Taking The Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach To Senate Confirmation Of Supreme Court Nominees, Gary J. Simson
Taking The Court Seriously: A Proposed Approach To Senate Confirmation Of Supreme Court Nominees, Gary J. Simson
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
On The Steadfastness And Courage Of Government Lawyers, Roger C. Cramton
On The Steadfastness And Courage Of Government Lawyers, Roger C. Cramton
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.