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Full-Text Articles in Law

Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence And America's Dominant Philosophy Of Law, Robert S. Summers Dec 1978

Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence And America's Dominant Philosophy Of Law, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The late Lon L. Fuller played an influential role in the development of American jurisprudence, but his views have not always prevailed. In this tribute to the memory of Professor Fuller, Professor Summers outlines the major tenets of what he perceives to be our dominant philosophy of law – “pragmatic instrumentalism” – by way of contrasting that philosophy with the views of Professor Fuller. Professor Summers concludes that these two philosophies differ in many important respects and that our dominant philosophy of law should accommodate, and may indeed already be in the process of accommodating, the thought of Professor Fuller.


Reflections On A Unified Theory Of Motive, Theodore Eisenberg Aug 1978

Reflections On A Unified Theory Of Motive, Theodore Eisenberg

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Defamatory Non-Media Speech And First Amendment Methodology, Steven H. Shiffrin Jun 1978

Defamatory Non-Media Speech And First Amendment Methodology, Steven H. Shiffrin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In the course of his eloquent commentary upon New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the late Professor Kalven enthused that the Court had written "an opinion that may prove to be the best and most important it has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech." This excitement was generated not by the Court's rather narrow holding but rather by the hope that Sullivan would serve as the opening wedge to dislodge the clear and present danger test, to dismantle the "two-level" approach to first amendment analysis (reflected in cases such as Chaplinsky, Beauharnais, and Roth …


Two Types Of Substantive Reasons: The Core Of A Theory Of Common-Law Justification, Robert S. Summers Jun 1978

Two Types Of Substantive Reasons: The Core Of A Theory Of Common-Law Justification, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.