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- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (1)
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- Ineffective representation in state post-conviction proceedings (1)
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- Martinez v. Ryan 556 U.S. 1 (2012) (1)
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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
How To Think About Religious Freedom In An Egalitarian Age, Nelson Tebbe
How To Think About Religious Freedom In An Egalitarian Age, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Coming To Grips With The Ethical Challenges For Capital Post-Conviction Representation Posed By Martinez V. Ryan, John H. Blume, W. Bradley Wendel
Coming To Grips With The Ethical Challenges For Capital Post-Conviction Representation Posed By Martinez V. Ryan, John H. Blume, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
In its groundbreaking decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1 (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States held that inadequate assistance of post-conviction counsel could be sufficient “cause” to excuse a procedural default thus allowing a federal court in habeas corpus proceedings to reach the merits of an otherwise barred claim that an inmate was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The upshot of Martinez is that, if state post-conviction counsel unreasonably (and prejudicially) fails to raise a viable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, then there is “cause” …
Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, And The Separation Of Powers, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, Barry R. Weingast
Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, And The Separation Of Powers, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, Barry R. Weingast
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not …
Incidental Burdens And The Nature Of Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf
Incidental Burdens And The Nature Of Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Activists and scholars contesting the meaning of the Second Amendment argue over a startling number of its twenty-seven words: "regulated," "Militia," "State," "people," "keep," "bear," and "Arms." Heller and McDonald sought to resolve most of these debates, but before Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller, no one noticed the potential for contestation over the Second Amendment's final word: "infringed." When does the application of a gun-neutral law infringe the right? In that deceptively simple question lurk important future debates over the Second Amendment, the Constitution, and law itself.
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Is The Constitution Special?, Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” If there was such a danger when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote those words, there is none today. Americans regularly assume that the Constitution is special, and legal professionals treat it differently from other sources of law. But what if that is wrongheaded? In this Article, we identify and question the professional practice of constitutional exceptionalism. First, we show that standard arguments from text, structure, and history work differently in constitutional law. Second, we examine the possible justifications for such distinctive interpretation among lawyers, and we find them …