Law Commons^™

The Perverse Effects Of Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

This Article explores the role of insurance as a substitute for direct regulation of risks posed by severe weather. In pricing the risk of human activity along the predicted path of storms, insurance can provide incentives for efficient location decisions as well as for cost-justified mitigation efforts in building construction and infrastructure. Currently, however, much insurance for severe-weather risks is provided and heavily subsidized by the government. This Article demonstrates two primary distortions arising from the government’s dominance in these insurance markets. First, existing government subsidies are allocated differentially across households, resulting in a significant regressive redistribution favoring affluent homeowners …

Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue, Daniel Schwarcz

Articles

Insurance companies are in the business of discrimination. Insurers attempt to segregate insureds into separate risk pools based on the differences in their risk profiles, first, so that different premiums can be charged to the different groups based on their differing risks and, second, to incentivize risk reduction by insureds. This is why we let insurers discriminate. There are limits, however, to the types of discrimination that are permissible for insurers. But what exactly are those limits and how are they justified? To answer these questions, this Article (a) articulates the leading fairness and efficiency arguments for and against limiting …

Towards A Universal Framework For Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue, Daniel Schwarcz

Articles

Discrimination in insurance is principally regulated at the state level. Surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation across coverage lines and policyholder characteristics in how and the extent to which risk classification by insurers is limited. Some statutes expressly permit insurers to consider certain characteristics, while other characteristics are forbidden or limited in various ways. What explains this variation across coverage lines and policyholder characteristics? Drawing on a unique, hand-collected data-set consisting of the laws regulating insurer risk classification in fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions, this Article argues that much of the variation in state-level regulation of risk classification can in …

The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Potential Insurance Coverage Implications, Lynn K. Neuner, W. Nicholson Price

Articles

More than 300 lawsuits have already been filed in Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama against BP and other corporations involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, including Transocean, Halliburton, and Cameron, with thousands more anticipated. This article briefly addresses the contours of the coverage lawsuit already filed against BP and other coverage disputes we may see in the future.

Tax Law Uncertainty And The Role Of Tax Insurance, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

In the broadest sense, this is an article about legal or regulatory uncertainty and the role that private and public insurance can play in managing it. More narrowly, the article is about tax law enforcement and the familiar if ill-defined distinctions between tax evasion, tax avoidance, and abusive tax avoidance. Most specifically, the article is about a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax indemnity insurance or transactional tax risk insurance that provides coverage against the risk that the Internal Revenue Service (Service) will disallow a taxpayer-insured's tax treatment of a particular transaction. The question is whether …

Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, David G. Carlson

Articles

Suppose A has a claim against B. B has a claim over against C. B, however, is insolvent and has not actually paid A. B's only asset is, in fact, B v C. To what extent can C claim that B v C is valueless - that B was not damaged because B was too broke to pay A?

This paper argues that the fundamental legal distinction between indemnity and liability is beginning to dissolve, because B can always pay A (and thereby give value to B v C) by borrowing the amount B owes and using B v C …

Eminent Domain Economics: Should ‘Just Compensation’ Be Abolished, And Would ‘Takings Insurance’ Work Instead?, Steve Calandrillo

Articles

In a defeat for staunch property rights advocates, the Supreme Court ruled this spring that a prohibition on land development in the Tahoe basin did not amount to a de facto taking of land such that the constitutional mandate of just compensation was triggered. The Tahoe decision highlights the struggle in eminent domain jurisprudence over the proper treatment of so-called regulatory takings. It has long been taken for granted that when the government exercises its power of eminent domain to take private property in the name of the public good, it must reimburse displaced landowners. While compensation for physical takings …

A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …

Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2 (Symposium: Consumer Protection And The Uniform Commercial Code), James J. White

Articles

The current draft of section 2-206 in Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") entitled "Consumer Contract: Standard Form"1 presents a unique and threatening challenge to the drafters of consumer form contracts. In earlier drafts, one part of the section applied to both to commercial contracts and consumer contracts. It required that "one manifest assent" to any form contract, commercial or consumer, in order for it to be binding.2 Bowing to commercial opposition in the most recent version, the drafters have omitted all reference to commercial contracts. As the section stands, it applies only to consumer contracts.

Faculty Spotlight - Kyle D. Logue, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Most of my teaching and research efforts are currently spent in two general fields of law - taxation and insurance. Which raises an interesting question: Why would a rational person decide to devote a good portion of his academic career to areas of law that many people - lawyers and nonlawyers alike - find painfully boring and unreasonably complicated? The ta and insurance lawyers in the audience, of course, already know the answer - that ta ation and insuran e are e ceptionally interesting topics and that, if one wants to understand how the real world works (in particular, the …

Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree …