Law Commons^™

How Insurance Substitutes For Regulation, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Legal regulation of behavior requires information. Acquiring information about the regulated party's conduct, setting benchmarks by which that conduct is measured, and establishing the correct scale of payoffs for violating or following regulation are costly and require expertise and motivation. Thus, economic theories of rulemaking are often based on the relative information advantages that different regulatory bodies have and how that information can be harnessed to enhance incentives and thereby improve welfare. Government regulators, on average, do not have informational advantages. They are not paid for performance and thus may lack adequate incentives. They are not disciplined by market forces …

California Dreaming: The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

Half of American workers are not covered by employer-sponsored retirement arrangements. The recently passed California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act seeks to solve this problem by mandating retirement savings arrangements for California employers, coupled with a public investment vehicle for investing these private retirement savings. The Act is important because of California’s size and status as a trendsetter for other states.

This Article is the first to examine the important legal questions the Act raises under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Contrary to the drafters’ intent, the savings accounts authorized under the Act do not qualify as individual …