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Full-Text Articles in Law
Federalism, Convergence, And Divergence In Constitutional Property, Gerald S. Dickinson
Federalism, Convergence, And Divergence In Constitutional Property, Gerald S. Dickinson
Articles
Federal law exerts a gravitational force on state actors, resulting in widespread conformity to federal law and doctrine at the state level. This has been well recognized in the literature, but scholars have paid little attention to this phenomenon in the context of constitutional property. Traditionally, state takings jurisprudence—in both eminent domain and regulatory takings—has strongly gravitated towards the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine. This long history of federal-state convergence, however, was disrupted by the Court’s controversial public use decision in Kelo v. City of New London. In the wake of Kelo, states resisted the Court’s validation of the …
Judicial Takings: Musings On Stop The Beach, James E. Krier
Judicial Takings: Musings On Stop The Beach, James E. Krier
Articles
Judicial takings weren’t much talked about until a few years ago, when the Stop the Beach case made them suddenly salient. The case arose from a Florida statute, enacted in 1961, that authorizes public restoration of eroded beaches by adding sand to widen them seaward. Under the statute, the state has title to any new dry land resulting from restored beaches, meaning that waterfront owners whose land had previously extended to the mean high-tide line end up with public beaches between their land and the water. This, the owners claimed, resulted in a taking of their property, more particularly their …
The Pastor, The Burning House, And The Double Jeopardy Clause: The True Story Behind Evans V. Michigan, David A. Moran
The Pastor, The Burning House, And The Double Jeopardy Clause: The True Story Behind Evans V. Michigan, David A. Moran
Articles
The true story behind Evans v. Michigan is that a man who was probably innocent, and who would almost certainly have been acquitted by the jury, had his trial shortened after it became obvious to the judge that the police had picked up a man who had nothing to do with the fire. In other words, the facts set forth by the Michigan Supreme Court, and repeated by Alito, were grossly misleading. And because I, like Alito, believed the Michigan Supreme Court’s version of the facts, I made a silly mistake when I agreed to take the case. That silly …
How Much Does It Matter Whether Courts Work Within The "Clearly Marked" Provisions Of The Bill Of Rights Or With The "Generalities" Of The Fourteenth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar
Articles
We know that it really mattered to Justice Hugo Black. As he made clear in his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California] Black was convinced that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to apply the complete protection of the Bill of Rights to the states.2 And, as he also made plain in his Adamson dissent, he was equally convinced that working with the "specific" or "explicit" guarantees of the first Eight Amendments would furnish Americans more protection than would applying the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
Public Ruses, James E. Krier, Christopher Serkin
Public Ruses, James E. Krier, Christopher Serkin
Articles
The public use requirement of eminent domain law may be working its way back into the United States Constitution. To be sure, the words "public use" appear in the document-and in many state constitutions as well, but the federal provision applies to the states in any event-as one of the Fifth Amendment's limitations on the government's inherent power to take private property against the will of its owners. (The other limitation is that "just compensation" must be paid, of which more later.) Any taking of private property, the text suggests, must be for public use. Those words, however, have amounted …
Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker
Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker
Articles
Constitutional law scholars have long observed that many doctrinal rules established by courts to protect constitutional rights seem to "overprotect" those rights, in the sense that they give greater protection to individuals than those rights, as abstractly understood, seem to require.' Such doctrinal rules are typically called "prophylactic" rules.2 Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, example of such a rule is Miranda v. Arizona,' in which the Supreme Court implemented the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination4 with a detailed set of directions for law enforcement officers conducting custodial interrogations, colloquially called the Miranda warnings. 5
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Articles
When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system, the federal system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of the fifty states. With the Bill of Rights provisions …
From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar
From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar
Articles
Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson] court-watchers knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases [the cases viewing Miranda's requirements as not rights protected by the Constitution, but merely "prophylactic rules"] or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn't "have to" do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.
Uncoupling The Law Of Takings, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier
Uncoupling The Law Of Takings, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier
Articles
The law of takings couples together matters that should be treated independently. The conventional view, shared by courts and commentators alike, has been that any takings case can be resolved in one of two ways: either there is a taking and compensation is due, or there is no taking and no compensation is due. These results are fine as long as one holding or the other serves the two central concerns of the Takings Clause - eficiency and justice. But a problem arises when the two purposes behind the law of takings come into cordhct, as they readily might. It …
Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar
Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar …
The Federal Constitution Is Not Violated By A State Law Compelling One Accused Of Crime To Testify Against Himself, James H. Brewster
The Federal Constitution Is Not Violated By A State Law Compelling One Accused Of Crime To Testify Against Himself, James H. Brewster
Articles
A case has been recently decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado, upon a condition of facts which it seems, has not an exact parallel in any of the reports. After being in litigation for more than eleven years the question involved was finally settled by the court of last resort of that state. In effect the decision goes to the extent of saying, that when a note is endorsed specially and afterwards comes back to the party making such special endorsement, and the party reissues the same without striking out his endorsement, no new endorsement is necessary, since the …