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Full-Text Articles in Law
Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard
Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.
National Regulation Of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay On Comity, Extraterritoriality, And Harmonization, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
National Regulation Of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay On Comity, Extraterritoriality, And Harmonization, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
Despite the economic importance of multinational enterprises ("MNEs"), there is a surprising paucity of law governing foreign direct investment ("FDI"), especially in comparison with the abundance of law governing trade. There is no multilateral legal arrangement governing FDI that is similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), no organization similar to the World Trade Organization, and almost no courses in law schools on FDI law. The goal of this Article is to begin to remedy this state of affairs by proposing a conceptual model for analyzing the application of the national laws of home and host countries …