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Administrative Law

University of Washington School of Law

Delegation

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Rulemaking As Legislating, Kathryn A. Watts Jan 2015

Rulemaking As Legislating, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

The central premise of the nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating its Article I legislative powers. Yet Congress routinely delegates to agencies the power to promulgate legislative rules—rules that carry the force and effect of law just as statutes do. Given this tension between the nondelegation doctrine and the modern regulatory state, some scholars have attacked the nondelegation doctrine as fictional.

Little scholarly attention, however, has been given to considering how the central premise of the nondelegation doctrine coheres with—or fails to cohere with—administrative law as a whole. This Article takes up that task, exploring what might happen to administrative …


Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, Kathryn A. Watts Jan 2012

Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, Kathryn A. Watts

Articles

The U.S. Supreme Court—thanks to various statutes passed by Congress beginning in 1891 and culminating in 1988—currently enjoys nearly unfettered discretion to set its docket using the writ of certiorari. Over the past few decades, concerns have mounted that the Court has been taking the wrong mix of cases, hearing too few cases, and relying too heavily on law clerks in the certiorari process.

Scholars, in turn, have proposed fairly sweeping reforms, such as the creation of a certiorari division to handle certiorari petitions. This Article argues that before the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is taken away, …


Agency Rules With The Force Of Law: The Original Convention, Thomas W. Merrill, Kathryn Tongue Watts Jan 2002

Agency Rules With The Force Of Law: The Original Convention, Thomas W. Merrill, Kathryn Tongue Watts

Articles

The Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Mead Corp. that agency interpretations should receive Chevron deference only when Congress has delegated power to the agency to make rules with the force of law and the agency has rendered its interpretation in the exercise of that power.

The first step of this inquiry is difficult to apply to interpretations adopted through rulemaking, because often rulemaking grants authorize the agency to make "such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter" or words to that effect, without specifying whether "rules and regulations" encompasses …