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Full-Text Articles in Law
Doctor Frankenstein's International Orgnizations, Andrew T. Guzman
Doctor Frankenstein's International Orgnizations, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
In the classic novel, Frankenstein, Doctor Frankenstein creates a living creature in the hope of cheating death. The monster, as the creature is called, horrifies Doctor Frankenstein, turns against him, and kills several people, causing the doctor to regret his decision to make the monster in the first place.
When states establish an international organization (IO), they create an institution with a life of its own on the international stage. Though states can, collectively, control the IO, without unanimity among them the organization can often act on its own. The danger for a state, then, is that its creation, like …
Extraterritoriality And Cooperation, Andrew Guzman
Extraterritoriality And Cooperation, Andrew Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
No abstract provided.
International Soft Law, Andrew T. Guzman, Timothy L. Meyer
International Soft Law, Andrew T. Guzman, Timothy L. Meyer
Andrew T Guzman
Although the concept of soft law has existed for years, scholars have not reached consensus on why states use soft law or even whether “soft law” is a coherent analytic category. In part, this confusion reflects a deep diversity in both the types of international agreements and the strategic situations that produce them. In this paper, we advance four complementary explanations for why states use soft law that describe a much broader range state behavior than has been previously explained.
First, and least significantly, states may use soft law to solve straightforward coordination games in which the existence of a …
How International Law Works: A Response To Commentators, Andrew T. Guzman
How International Law Works: A Response To Commentators, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
This is a response to the discussion of commentators in a symposium on my book, How International Law Works.
How International Law Works: Introduction, Andrew T. Guzman
How International Law Works: Introduction, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
This comment serves as the introduction to a symposium on my book, How International Law Works.
The Myth Of International Delegation, Andrew T. Guzman, Jennifer Landsidle
The Myth Of International Delegation, Andrew T. Guzman, Jennifer Landsidle
Andrew T Guzman
There is a growing and misinformed sense in some quarters that the United States and other countries have engaged (and continue to engage) in delegations to international institution that involve a significant threat to domestic sovereignty. Concerns about such delegations come from academics (John Yoo: “Novel forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to international organizations”), prominent politicians (Bob Barr: “Nary a thought is given when international organizations, like the UN, attempt to enforce their myopic vision of a one-world government upon America, while trumping our Constitution in the process. Moreover, many in our own …
The Promise Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
The Promise Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
In their recent book, The Limits of International Law, Professors Goldsmith and Posner throw down the gauntlet to scholars of international law. They advance a deeply pessimistic account of international law and its role in affecting state behavior -- alleging that customary international fails to act as “an exogenous influence on states’ behavior,” and expressing skepticism that multinational collective action problems can be solved by treaty. This review represents a response to the book’s claims. It is demonstrated that there is no theoretical reason to conclude that international law is ineffective, whether it addresses bilateral or multilateral problems and whether …
The Design Of International Agreements, Andrew T. Guzman
The Design Of International Agreements, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
States entering into international agreements have at their disposal several tools to enhance the strength and credibility of their commitments, including the ability to make the agreement a formal treaty rather than soft law, provide for mandatory dispute resolution procedures, and establish monitoring mechanisms. Each of these strategies – referred to as ‘design elements’ – increases the costs associated with the violation of an agreement and, therefore, the probability of compliance. Yet even a passing familiarity with international agreements makes it clear that states routinely fail to include these design elements in their agreements. This article explains why rational states …
A Compliance-Based Theory Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
A Compliance-Based Theory Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
This Article examines international law from the perspective of compliance. It puts forward a theory of international law in which compliance comes about in a model of rational, self-interested states. International law can affect state behavior because states are concerned about the reputational and direct sanctions that follow its violation. The model allows us to consider international law in a new light. Most strikingly, one is forced to reconsider two of the most fundamental doctrinal points in the field-the definitions of customary international law (“CIL”) and of international law itself. A reputational model of compliance makes it clear that CIL …
The Cost Of Credibility: Explaining Resistance To Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Andrew T. Guzman
The Cost Of Credibility: Explaining Resistance To Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T Guzman
This paper explains why the use of mandatory dispute resolution clauses is the exception rather than the rule in international agreements. On one hand, these clauses increase the sanction for violation of the agreement and thereby increase the probability that the parties will comply. On the other hand, dispute resolution clauses impose a loss on the parties when violations occur. States, therefore, must balance the credibility and compliance benefits of a mandatory dispute resolution provision against the joint costs imposed by those provisions in the event of a violation. The paper develops a series of predictive and normative results based …