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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Schumpeterian Competition And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Schumpeterian Competition And Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Joseph Schumpeter's vision of competition saw it as a destructive process in which effort, assets and fortunes were continuously destroyed by innovation. One possible implication is that antitrust's attention on short-run price and output issues is myopic: what seems at first glance to be a monopolistic exclusionary practice might really be an innovative enterprise with enormous payoffs in the long run. While this may be the case, three qualifications are critical. First, one must not confuse the prospect of innovation with the scope of the intellectual property laws; their excesses and special interest capture cast serious doubt on the proposition …
The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits As Antitrust Violations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits As Antitrust Violations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Antitrust law's Walker Process doctrine permits a patent infringement defendant to show that an improperly maintained infringement action constitutes unlawful monopolization or an unlawful attempt to monopolize. The infringement defendant must show both that the lawsuit is improper, which establishes the conduct portion of the violation and generally satisfies tort law requirements, and also that the structural prerequisites for the monopolization offense are present. The doctrine also applies to non-patent infringement actions and has been applied by the Supreme Court to copyright infringement actions. Walker Process itself somewhat loosely derives from the Supreme Court's Noerr-Pennington line of cases holding that …
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Unilateral Refusals To Deal, Vertical Integration, And The Essential Facility Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. There is no independent justification for an essential facility doctrine separate and apart from general Section 2 doctrine governing the vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to deal. In its Trinko decision the Supreme Court placed that doctrine about where it should be. The Court did not categorically reject all unilateral refusal to deal claims, but it placed …
The Antitrust Standard For Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Antitrust Standard For Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This essay considers the general definition of unlawful exclusionary practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as acts that: (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting benefits. An important purpose of this progression of queries is to permit the court to avoid balancing, although balancing certainly cannot be avoided in some close cases. The given definition is very …
Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Patent Deception In Standard Setting: The Case For Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Many patent applications are rejected upon initial submission, but they are almost never rejected with absolute finality. Further, subsequent to filing its original application a patent applicant might wish to write an application with broader or somewhat different claims, or perhaps add claims that were not made in the original application. Or it may wish to rewrite claims that had been rejected in the original application. A patent "continuation" is an application for additional claims made on a patent that was previously applied for.
Under generally accepted patent practices in the United States, when a subsequent continuation or divisional application …
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande
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Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.
This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare …
Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Innovation And The Domain Of Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that restrain competition unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public domain beyond that which the Constitution contemplates, or as Congress intended for them to be expanded. In fact, antitrust has a dual role as promoter of competition in IP intensive markets. It regulates both restraints on competition and restraints on innovation. The first line protector of the competitive process in innovation is the IP statutes themselves. The Constitutional Mandate to Congress to create intellectual property regimes in order to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts is …
Exclusionary Bundled Discounts And The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Exclusionary Bundled Discounts And The Antitrust Modernization Commission, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a bundle of goods than for its components when sold separately. A characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who makes only one of the products in the bundle may have to give a larger per item discount in order to compensate the buyer for the foregone discount on goods that the rival does not sell. For example, if I sell A and B and offer a 20% discount only to customers who purchase one A and one B together, a rival in the B market might be able …
The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Intellectual Property-Antitrust Interface, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This historical overview examines the relationship between antitrust policy and intellectual property in the United States since 1890. Over most of this history, judges imagined far greater conflicts between antitrust policy and intellectual property rights than actually existed, or else relied on sweeping generalizations rather than close analysis. For example, they often assumed that the presence of an intellectual property right led to anticompetitive effects where there was no basis for finding any injury to competition at all. At the other extreme, they often concluded that an intellectual property right immunized seriously anticompetitive conduct even when the intellectual property statute …