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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law
Block Rewards, Carried Interests, And Other Valuation Quandaries In Taxing Compensation, Henry M. Ordower
Block Rewards, Carried Interests, And Other Valuation Quandaries In Taxing Compensation, Henry M. Ordower
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In this article, Ordower contextualizes block rewards litigation with historical failures to tax compensation income paid in kind. Tax fairness principles demand current taxation of the noneconomically diluting block rewards’ market value.
Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential For Compensation And Deterrence, Robert H. Lande
Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential For Compensation And Deterrence, Robert H. Lande
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Recent empirical studies demonstrate five reasons why antitrust class action cases are essential: (1) class actions are virtually the only way for most victims of antitrust violations to receive compensation; (2) most successful class actions involve collusion that was anticompetitive; (3) class victims’ compensation has been modest, generally less than their damages; (4) class actions deter significant amounts of collusion and other anticompetitive behavior; and (5) anticompetitive collusion is underdeterred, a problem that would be exacerbated without class actions. Unfortunately, a number of court decisions have undermined class action cases, thus preventing much effective and important antitrust enforcement.
Reducing False Guilty Pleas And Wrongful Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation, Murat C. Mungan, Jonathan Klick
Reducing False Guilty Pleas And Wrongful Convictions Through Exoneree Compensation, Murat C. Mungan, Jonathan Klick
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A great concern with plea-bargains is that they may induce innocent individuals to plead guilty to crimes they have not committed. In this article, we identify schemes that reduce the number of innocent-pleas without affecting guilty individuals' plea-bargain incentives. Large compensations for exonerees reduce expected costs associated with wrongful determinations of guilt in trial and thereby reduce the number of innocent-pleas. Any distortions in guilty individuals' incentives to take plea bargains caused by these compensations can be off-set by a small increase in the discounts offered for pleading guilty. Although there are many statutory reform proposals for increasing exoneration compensations, …
Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande
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The dominant view in the antitrust field is that private enforcement cases, and especially class actions, accomplish little or nothing positive but, on the contrary, are counterproductive. Despite strongly worded convictions, that view has been premised on anecdotal, self-serving and insufficiently substantiated claims. Indeed, the authors' 2008 study of 40 private cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about a significant number of private antitrust actions. That study generated a great deal of controversy, including questioning of our conclusions by high officials at the Department of Justice and by Professor Daniel Crane at the University of …
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
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Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice.
In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
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This short piece takes a first step toward providing the empirical bases for an assessment of the benefits of private enforcement. It presents evidence showing that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest. Private enforcement helps compensate victimized consumers, and it also helps deter anticompetitive conduct. This piece demonstrates this by briefly summarizing a more detailed analysis of forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases.
To analyze these cases' compensation effects this presents, inter alia, the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was …
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.
In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …
Overcoming Under-Compensation And Under-Deterrence In Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages The Best Remedy?, Stephen J. Shapiro
Overcoming Under-Compensation And Under-Deterrence In Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages The Best Remedy?, Stephen J. Shapiro
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This Article advocates that states' statutes make greater and more systematic use of multiple damages by extending them to a much broader range of intentional, wrongful conduct. Part II of this Article will explain why extra-compensatory relief is called for when tortious conduct is intentional or malicious. Part III will compare punitive damages, attorney fees, and treble or other multiple damages as possible sources of additional relief. Part IV will focus on multiple damages. The Article will examine the range of existing state statutes and discuss why and how those statutes might be extended to a broader range of wrongful …
Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement And Criminal Enforcement Of The U.S. Antitrust Laws, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement And Criminal Enforcement Of The U.S. Antitrust Laws, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
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This article shows that private enforcement of the U. S. antitrust laws-which usually is derided as essentially worthless-serves as a more important deterrent of anticompetitive behavior than the most esteemed antitrust program in the world, criminal enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The debate over the value of private antitrust enforcement long has been heavy with self-serving assertions by powerful economic interests, but light on factual evidence. To help fill this void we have been conducting research for several years on a variety of empirical topics. This article develops and then explores the implications of …
Rewarding Prosecutors For Performance, Stephanos Bibas
Rewarding Prosecutors For Performance, Stephanos Bibas
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Prosecutorial discretion is a problem that most scholars attack from the outside. Most scholars favor external institutional solutions, such as ex ante legislation or ex post judicial and bar review of individual cases of misconduct. At best these approaches can catch the very worst misconduct. They lack inside information and sustained oversight and cannot generate and enforce fine-grained rules to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking. The more promising alternative is to work within prosecutors' offices, to create incentives for good performance. This symposium essay explores a neglected toolbox that head prosecutors can use to influence line prosecutors: compensation and other rewards. Rewards …
Prejudgment Interest In International Arbitration, Jeffrey M. Colon, Michael S. Knoll
Prejudgment Interest In International Arbitration, Jeffrey M. Colon, Michael S. Knoll
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Tribunals in international arbitration are regularly asked by claimants to award prejudgment interest. Unless foreclosed by an agreement between the parties, there is widespread agreement prejudgment interest should put the claimant in the same position as it would have been had it not been injured by the respondent. However, there is little consensus how to calculate prejudgment interest in order to accomplish that purpose. In this Essay, we describe the proper method of calculating prejudgment interest based on sound financial principles. Using the paradigm that the respondent has forced the claimant to make an involuntary loan to the respondent, we …
Taking Compensation Private, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
Taking Compensation Private, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
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In light of the expansive interpretation of the ""public use"" requirement, the payment of ""just compensation"" remains the only meaningful limit on the government's eminent domain power and, correspondingly, the only safeguard of private property owners' rights against abusive takings. Yet, the current compensation regime is suboptimal. While both efficiency and fairness require paying full compensation for seizures by eminent domain, current law limits the compensation to market value. Despite the virtual consensus about the inadequacy of market compensation, courts adhere to it for a purely practical reason: there is no way to measure the true subjective value of property …
Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande
Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande
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This article examines five common beliefs about antitrust damages and shows they all are untrue.
Myth #1. Antitrust violations give rise to treble damages.
Myth #2. There is "duplication" of antitrust damages because many defendants pay six-fold or more damages.
Myth #3. Courts should go easy on defendants when formulating liability rules or calculating overcharges because the awarded damages from a finding of an antitrust violation are so severe.
Myth #4. The size of the harms caused by antitrust violations, even by such "hardcore" violations as naked cartels, is relatively modest, and criminal penalties resulting from violations are out of …
Bargaining For Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
Bargaining For Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky
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Efficiency and fairness require paying full compensation to property owners when their property is taken by eminent domain. Yet, to date, the evidentiary challenge of proving subjective value has proved insurmountable, and current law requires condemnees to settle for fair market value. This Article proposes a self-assessment mechanism that can make full compensation at subjective value practical. Under our proposal, property owners must be given the opportunity to state the value of the property designated for condemnation. Once property owners name their price, the government can take the property only at that price. However, if the government chooses not to …
The Calculation Of Prejudgment Interest, Michael S. Knoll, Jeffrey M. Colon
The Calculation Of Prejudgment Interest, Michael S. Knoll, Jeffrey M. Colon
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This Essay describes the proper method of calculating prejudgment interest based on sound financial principles. Using the paradigm that the claim plaintiff holds in litigation represents an involuntary loan from plaintiff to defendant and recognizing that in bankruptcy courts treat legal claims similarly to unsecured debt, we argue that prejudgment interest should be computed using the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate. Furthermore, we argue that courts should use a short-term, floating interest rate rather than a long-term rate in order to provide the proper incentive for the parties to settle. We criticize alternative bases for awarding prejudgment interest and address modifications …
Governmental Liability Under Cercla, Steven A.G. Davison
Governmental Liability Under Cercla, Steven A.G. Davison
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No abstract provided.