Law Commons^™

The Executive Branch Anticanon, Deborah Pearlstein

Articles

Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential” effects. While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive branch conduct: judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive branch and the people themselves draw on past …

Response Letter To Chairman Mcgovern On Remote Voting, Deborah Pearlstein

Testimony

Letter sent to Congressman Jim McGovern, Chair of the House Rules Committee. This letter has been entered into the Congressional Record.

"I read with interest an article by Mssrs. Mark Strand and Tim Lang introduced into the record during yesterday’s hearing of the House Rules Committee on H. Res. 965 - Authorizing remote voting by proxy in the House of Representatives. Having written elsewhere in detail about my conviction that the rules change under consideration readily passes constitutional muster, I am grateful for the opportunity to explain why the Strand and Lang position fails to persuade."

Letter To Chairman Mcgovern On Remote Voting, Deborah Pearlstein

Testimony

Letter written to Congressman Jim McGovern, Chair of the House Rules Committee. This letter has been entered into the Congressional Record.

As a professor of constitutional law, and a scholar who has written extensively on separation of powers issues in U.S. Government, I believe adopting procedures to allow for remote voting under these extraordinary circumstances is not only lawful, but essential to the maintenance of our constitutional democracy. Recognizing that specific procedures for remote voting may still be in development, the analysis offered here focuses foremost on the broad scope of Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate its voting procedures.