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Full-Text Articles in Law
What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall S. Thomas
What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation In M&A Deals?, Randall S. Thomas
Vanderbilt Law Review
Companies and their investors have been battling over the value of representative shareholder litigation since at least the 1940s. Investors argue that managerial agency costs are high and that class actions and derivative suits are key shareholder monitoring mechanisms that they can deploy to keep managers in line. Companies, on the other hand, believe that the plaintiffs' bar drives representative litigation claims, as agency costs in contingency fee suits make the lawyer the real party in interest. Over the past several decades, there have been numerous skirmishes between these two sets of actors, manifesting themselves, for example, in congressional debates …
Fee Shifting And The Free Market, Jonathan T. Molot
Fee Shifting And The Free Market, Jonathan T. Molot
Vanderbilt Law Review
It is uncontroversial that litigation is too expensive. Controversy abounds, however, over who is to blame and what is to be done about the problem. Plaintiffs and defendants each accuse the other of pursuing weak or meritless litigation positions that inflict needless expense. This Article suggests that regardless of who is correct-and who is more often at fault-the same set of solutions may be available to assuage the problem. The Article embraces a combination of procedural reforms and market mechanisms designed to improve matters for both sides and to make it less likely that a party with a meritorious litigation …
The Market For Preclusion In Merger Litigation, Sean J. Griffith, Alexandra D. Lahav
The Market For Preclusion In Merger Litigation, Sean J. Griffith, Alexandra D. Lahav
Vanderbilt Law Review
Delaware dominates the corporate law market.' More than half of all public companies and over sixty percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware. These companies are subject to Delaware's corporate law regardless of where their businesses are physically located. Although academics continue to debate whether it is good or bad, they have long agreed that Delaware's dominance is a result of its law and its judiciary. As a corollary, it was widely understood that Delaware courts decided most cases involving Delaware corporations. The discovery that litigation involving these corporations very often takes place outside of Delaware therefore came …
Making Money: Leverage And Private Sector Money Creation, Margaret M. Blair
Making Money: Leverage And Private Sector Money Creation, Margaret M. Blair
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, practitioners and theorists in law, finance, and economics are rethinking our theories about how the financial sector influences the real economy. In particular, they are reexamining the linkages among financial innovation, supply of credit and money, monetary policy, bubbles, financial stability, and economic growth. One of the key issues that is being reconsidered is the dynamics of how banks and other financial institutions drive credit creation and credit allocation, and how these factors, in turn affect the performance of the macroeconomy. In this article, I argue that, by providing an alternative …
The First Year Of "Say On Pay" Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis And Look Forward, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter
The First Year Of "Say On Pay" Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis And Look Forward, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Using voting data from the first year of say-on-pay votes under Dodd- Frank, we look at the patterns of shareholder voting in advisory votes on exec- utive pay. Consistent with the more limited say-on-pay voting before Dodd- Frank, we find that shareholders in the first year under Dodd-Frank generally gave broad support to management pay packages. But not all pay packages received strong shareholder support. At some companies, management suf- fered the embarrassment of failed say-on-pay votes-that is, less than fifty per- cent of their company's shareholders voted in favor of the proposal. In particular, we find that poorly performing …