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Vanderbilt University Law School

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Product liability

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2012

Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Product liability law is intended to create an environment that fosters safer products. However, this law often has adverse consequences. Some of the problems stem from the inherent nature of product risk decisions and the function of tort liability, while others may derive from individuals’ cognitive limitations and inability to think properly about balancing risk and cost. This paper examines both types of problems and summarizes relevant academic literature.


Product Liability, Research And Development, And Innovation, W. Kip Viscusi, Michael J. Moore Jan 1993

Product Liability, Research And Development, And Innovation, W. Kip Viscusi, Michael J. Moore

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Product liability ideally should promote efficient levels of product safety, but misdirected liability efforts may depress beneficial innovations. This paper examines these competing effects of liability costs on product R & D intensity and new product introductions by manufacturing firms. At low to moderate levels of expected liability costs, there is a positive effect of liability costs on product innovation. At very high levels of liability costs, the effect is negative. At the sample mean, liability costs increase R & D intensity by 15 percent. The greater linkage of these effects to product R & D rather than process R …


Product Liability Litigation With Risk Averson, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 1988

Product Liability Litigation With Risk Averson, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The recent law and economics literature has directed much energy toward identifying the various factors that determine whether parties will litigate or settle accident claims.' The substantive interest in this area rests in large measure on the obvious element of conflict in all these cases: the plaintiff is trying to obtain reimbursement for his losses from the defendant, which the defendant wishes to avoid paying. The strategic structure of their interaction is quite complex because the outcomes of bringing claims are heavily influenced by the costs, usually substantial, of both bargaining and litigating. The game between plaintiff and defendant is …