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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Randall Thomas, Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven D. Solomon
The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Randall Thomas, Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven D. Solomon
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award. We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …
Delaware's Retreat, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Delaware's Retreat, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The 1980’s is appropriately considered the Golden Age of Delaware corporate law. Within that era, the Delaware courts won international attention by not just erecting the legal pillars that frame today’s corporate governance discourse but by interjecting a fresh perspective on the rights of owners and the prerogatives of managers. Four decisions stand out within a melodious chorus of great decisions of that era - Revlon , Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., and Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corporation. We refer collectively to the decisions as the Golden …
Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Carrots & Sticks: How Vcs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams To Sell Startups, Brian Broughman, Jesse Fried
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Venture capitalists (VCs) usually exit their investments in a startup via a trade sale. But the entrepreneurial team – the startup’s founder, other executives, and common shareholders – may resist a trade sale. Such resistance is likely to be particularly intense when the sale price is low relative to VCs’ liquidation preferences. Using a hand-collected dataset of Silicon Valley firms, we investigate how VCs overcome such resistance. We find, in our sample, that VCs give bribes (carrots) to the entrepreneurial team in 45% of trade sales; in these sales, carrots total an average of 9% of deal value. The overt …