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Full-Text Articles in Law

Detecting Mens Rea In The Brain, Owen D. Jones, Read Montague, Gideon Yaffe Jan 2020

Detecting Mens Rea In The Brain, Owen D. Jones, Read Montague, Gideon Yaffe

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

What if the widely used Model Penal Code (MPC) assumes a distinction between mental states that doesn’t actually exist? The MPC assumes, for instance, that there is a real distinction in real people between the mental states it defines as “knowing” and “reckless.” But is there?

If there are such psychological differences, there must also be brain differences. Consequently, the moral legitimacy of the Model Penal Code’s taxonomy of culpable mental states – which punishes those in defined mental states differently – depends on whether those mental states actually correspond to different brain states in the way the MPC categorization …


Why Choose? A Response To Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie, Terry A. Maroney Jan 2015

Why Choose? A Response To Rachlinski, Wistrich & Guthrie, Terry A. Maroney

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In "Heart Versus Head," Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich present experimental findings suggesting that judges sometimes rule on the basis of emotion rather than reason. Though there is much of value in their findings, they have presented a false choice. The experiments do offer strong evidence that judges' decisions can be influenced by the "affect heuristic," insofar as they show that prompting generalized feelings of good/bad and like/dislike can sway legal rulings that ought to be answered entirely on traditionally legalistic grounds. However, the experiments do not speak more broadly to the influence of judicial emotion, which is a far more …


The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination Of Executive Branch Justice, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich Jan 2009

The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination Of Executive Branch Justice, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.


"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie Jan 2008

"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Tracey E. George, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.


"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George Jan 2008

"The Threes": Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, Chris Guthrie, Tracey E. George

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Essay--the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court--we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decision making... With respect to the prospect of different Court outcomes, we demonstrate empirically in this Essay that the vast majority of cases decided during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries--including "Grutter", "Roe", and "Bush v. Gore" --would have come out the same way if the Court had decided them in panels rather than as a full Court.


Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich Jan 2007

Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Relying on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we propose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate explanation of judicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly accurate, but which …


Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," And The Criminal Defendant, Terry A. Maroney Jan 2006

Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," And The Criminal Defendant, Terry A. Maroney

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Adjudicative competence, more commonly referred to as competence to stand trial, is a highly under-theorized area of law. Though it is well established that, to be competent, a criminal defendant must have a "rational" as well as 'factual" understanding of her situation, the meaning of such "rational understanding" has gone largely undefined. Given the large number of criminal prosecutions in which competence is at issue, the doctrine's instability stands in stark contrast to its importance. This Article argues that adjudicative competence, properly understood, asks whether a criminal defendant has capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required …


Anchoring, Information, Expertise, And Negotiation: New Insights From Meta-Analysis, Chris Guthrie, Dan Orr Jan 2006

Anchoring, Information, Expertise, And Negotiation: New Insights From Meta-Analysis, Chris Guthrie, Dan Orr

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this article, we conduct a meta-analysis of studies of simulated negotiations to explore the impact of an initial "anchor," typically an opening demand or offer, on negotiation outcomes. We find that anchoring has a significant impact on the deals that negotiators reach. We also explore whether negotiator experience and the information environment mitigate the influence of anchoring. We conclude by offering prescriptive advice, both "offensive" and "defensive," to negotiators.


Risk Realization, Emotion, And Policy Making, Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Risk Realization, Emotion, And Policy Making, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In their study of terrorism and SARS, Professor Feigenson and his colleagues report "significant positive correlations between people's risk perceptions and their negative affect." In their review of the judgment and decision-making literature, Professor Slovic and his colleagues document the interplay between reason and emotion in assessing risk. And in the context of a soldier's concerns for himself and his family, Professor Moran provides a powerful narrative of fear. But what happens when such threats are actually realized? Do we accurately predict the emotional impact of such events? Or are there meaningful and predictable differences between the feelings we forecast …


Insights From Cognitive Psychology, Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Insights From Cognitive Psychology, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

My goal in this paper is to explore cognitive psychology's place in the dispute resolution field. To do so, I first look back and then look forward. Looking back, I identify the five insights from cognitive psychology that have had the biggest impact on my own dispute resolution teaching and scholarship. Looking forward, I identify my five hopes for the future of cognitive psychology in the dispute resolution field.


Heuristics And Biases At The Bargaining Table, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 2004

Heuristics And Biases At The Bargaining Table, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this essay, written for a symposium on The Emerging Interdisciplinary Cannon of Negotiation, we examine the role of heuristics in negotiation from two vantage points. First, we identify the way in which some common heuristics are likely to influence the negotiator's decision-making processes. Namely, we discuss anchoring and adjustment, availability, self-serving evaluations, framing, the status quo bias, contrast effects, and reactive devaluation. Understanding these common heuristics and how they can cause negotiators' judgments and choices to deviate from the normative model can enable negotiators to reorient their behavior so it more closely aligns with the normative model or, alternatively, …


Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, And The Law, Chris Guthrie Jan 2003

Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, And The Law, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

To understand how people behave in an uncertain world - and to make viable recommendations about how the law should try to shape that behavior - legal scholars must employ a model or theory of decision making. Only with an understanding of how people are likely to respond to legal rules can legal scholars, judges, legislators, and regulators craft rules that are likely to encourage desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior. Rather than rely on rational choice theory, behavioral law and economics scholars (or legal decision theorists) have turned to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's "prospect theory" to inform their …


Panacea Or Pandora's Box?: The Costs Of Options In Negotiation, Chris Guthrie Jan 2003

Panacea Or Pandora's Box?: The Costs Of Options In Negotiation, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The prescriptive literature on negotiation advises negotiators to generate, evaluate, and select from multiple options at the bargaining table. At first glance, this "option-generation prescription" seems unassailable. After all, negotiators can include in their agreements only those options that they actually consider, so the more options they consider, the more likely it seems they will reach an agreement that maximizes their preferences. Upon closer inspection, however, the option-generation prescription begins to appear vulnerable, for it rests on a questionable premise about negotiator behavior. The option-generation prescription assumes that negotiators will make rational decisions when selecting from multiple options; regardless of …


Judging By Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions In Judicial Decision Making, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich Jan 2002

Judging By Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions In Judicial Decision Making, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The institutional legitmacy of the judiciary depends on the quality of the judgments that judges make. Even the most talented and dedicated judges surely make occasional mistakes, but the public expects judges to avoid making systematic errors that favor particular parties or writing opinions that embed these mistakes into the substantive law. Psychological research on human judgment, however, suggests that this expectation might be unrealistic.


All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry Jan 2000

All Or Nothing: Explaining The Size Of Supreme Court Majorities, Paul H. Edelman, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Article, Professors Edelman and Sherry use a probabilistic model to explore the process of coalition formation on the United States Supreme Court. They identify coalition formation as a Markov process with absorbing states and examine voting patterns from twelve Court Terms. On the basis of their data, they conclude that Justices are reluctant to remain in small minorities. Surprisingly, however, they also find that a three-Justice minority coalition is less likely to suffer defections than a four-Justice minority coalition. This counterintuitive result suggests that while in general it is minority Justices rather than majority Justices who drive the …


Smoking Status And Public Responses To Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence, W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, Joel Hubert Jan 1999

Smoking Status And Public Responses To Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence, W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, Joel Hubert

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Situations in which individuals receive information seldom involve scientific consensus over the level of the risk. When scientific experts disagree, people may process the information in an unpredictable manner. The original data presented here for environmental risk judgments indicate a tendency to place disproportionate weight on the high risk assessment, irrespective of its source, particularly when the experts disagree. Cigarette smokers differ in their risk information processing from nonsmokers in that they place less weight on the high risk judgment when there is a divergence in expert opinion. Consequently, they are more likely to simply average competing risk assessments.


Developing A Positive Theory Of Decisionmaking On U.S. Courts Of Appeals, Tracey E. George Jan 1998

Developing A Positive Theory Of Decisionmaking On U.S. Courts Of Appeals, Tracey E. George

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

As the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals become an increasingly important part of American legal discourse, the debate concerning adjudication theories of the circuit courts gain particular relevance. Whereas, to date, the issue has received mostly normative treatment, this Article proceeds systematically and confronts the positive inquiry: how do courts of appeals judges actually decide cases? The Article proposes theoretically, tests empirically, and considers the implications of, a combined attitudinal and strategic model of en banc court of appeals decision making. The results challenge the classicist judges, legal scholars, and practitioners' normative frameworks, and suggest positive theory's …


Nameless Justice: The Case For The Routine Use Of Anonymous Juries In Criminal Trials, Nancy J. King Jan 1996

Nameless Justice: The Case For The Routine Use Of Anonymous Juries In Criminal Trials, Nancy J. King

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We ask a lot of our jurors. The financial and emotional burdens of jury duty can be significant even in mundane cases. Deciding another's fate is often a trying ordeal, aggravated by unintelligible instructions, hostile attorneys or court personnel, miserable working conditions, and interminable delays.1 The voir dire process may require jurors to reveal intimate, embarrassing, or damning information about themselves and their families that they would not voluntarily choose to reveal.2 Confronted with allegations of violence, injury, or abuse, some jurors become traumatized or ill.3 On top of all of this jury service exposes jurors, their families, and their …


Worker Learning And Compensating Differentials, W. Kip Viscusi, Michael J. Moore Jan 1991

Worker Learning And Compensating Differentials, W. Kip Viscusi, Michael J. Moore

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In the standard compensating wage differential model, workers value their wage and workers' compensation components based on full job risk information. Market forces generate positive wage differentials as ex ante compensation for exposure to relatively high risk. Similarly, market forces generate wage offsets for the increases in ex post risk compensation embodied in workers' compensation benefits. These predictions can be modified to take into account potential imperfections in worker information, as in Viscusi (1979a,b, 1980a,b,d), where the role of learning is incorporated into the worker's decision model. The potential for learning about risks introduces a new market response through worker …


Are Individuals Bayesian Decision Makers?, W. Kip Viscusi May 1985

Are Individuals Bayesian Decision Makers?, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

There has been increasing interest in whether normative models of individual choice under uncertainty accord with actual behavior. These concerns have been much greater than in other economic contexts because of the particularly severe demands such decisions place on the rationality of the decision maker. The limitations of these decisions have widespread consequences, as they provide the rationale for many governmental efforts to regulate the risks people face. Here I explore the issues raised by a Bayesian decision framework, focusing particularly on my analyses of worker and consumer behavior.