Law Commons^™

Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation. This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …

Agency Coordination In Shared Regulatory Space, Jim Rossi, Jody Freeman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that inter-agency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance. It explains why lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to "share regulatory space," why these delegations are so pervasive and stubborn, and why consolidating or eliminating agency functions will not solve the problems they create. The Article describes a variety of tools that Congress, the President and the agencies can use to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal inter-agency agreements, and joint policymaking. The Article assesses the relative costs and benefits of these coordination tools, using the normative …

Agency Independence After Pcaob, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Separation of powers has a new endeavor. The PCAOB decision makes the validity of good-cause removal protections depend on the separation of adjudicative from policymaking and enforcement functions within the agency. At a minimum, within independent agencies, it preserves the second layer of removal protection only for dedicated adjudicators. But its logic extends further. In PCAOB, the demand for political supervision over rulemaking and enforcement trumped Congress's choice to preserve the independence of officials who perform those roles and also adjudicate. In that way, PCAOB reversed the consistent constitutional validation of good-cause removal protections for those who engage in adjudication. …

Obama's Equivocal Defense Of Agency Independence, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

You can't judge a President by his view of Article II. At the very least, only looking to a President's construction of Article II gives a misleading portrait of the actual legal authority recent Presidents have asserted.

President Obama is no exception, as revealed by his defense of the constitutionality of an independent agency from challenge under Article II in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board' (PCAOB) in the Supreme Court this term. The PCAOB is an independent agency, located inside the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), created to regulate accounting of public companies in the wake of …

Agency Statutory Interpretation And Policymaking Form, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this short symposium contribution, I take up this invitation to examine the relevance of the agency's policymaking form to its approach to statutory interpretation. The core point I wish to advance is a relatively basic one--namely, that an agency's approach to statutory interpretation is in part a function of the policymaking form through which it acts. My strategy is to examine two of the most important policymaking forms--notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication--and to argue that the considerations that distinguish agency and judicial interpretation have a markedly different place in these two agency policymaking forms. For purposes of exposition, I …

Reclaiming The Legal Fiction Of Congressional Delegation, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations is based on a legal fiction – namely, that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. Critics argue that the fiction is false because Congress is unlikely to think about the delegation of interpretive authority at all, or in the way that the Court imagines. They also contend that the fiction is fraudulent because the Court does actually care about whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority in any particular instance, but applies a presumption triggered by statutory ambiguity or a particularized analysis involving factors unrelated to congressional delegation. In …

The Constitutional Foundations Of Chenery, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court regularly upholds federal legislation on grounds other than those stated by Congress. Likewise, an appellate court may affirm a lower court judgment even if the lower court's opinion expressed the wrong reasons for it. Not so in the case of judicial review of administrative agencies. The established rule, formulated in SEC v. Chenery Corp., is that a reviewing court may uphold an agency's action only on the grounds upon which the agency relied when it acted. This Article argues that something more than distrust of agency lawyers is at work in Chenery. By making the validity of …

Panacea Or Pandora's Box?: The Costs Of Options In Negotiation, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The prescriptive literature on negotiation advises negotiators to generate, evaluate, and select from multiple options at the bargaining table. At first glance, this "option-generation prescription" seems unassailable. After all, negotiators can include in their agreements only those options that they actually consider, so the more options they consider, the more likely it seems they will reach an agreement that maximizes their preferences. Upon closer inspection, however, the option-generation prescription begins to appear vulnerable, for it rests on a questionable premise about negotiator behavior. The option-generation prescription assumes that negotiators will make rational decisions when selecting from multiple options; regardless of …

Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within The Architecture Of Chevron, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article addresses critically the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S.Ct. 1655 (2000), for standards of judicial review of agency interpretations of law. Christensen is a notable case in the administrative law area because it purports to clarify application of the deference doctrine first articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). By reviving this doctrine, the case narrows application of the predominant approach to deference articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), thus reducing the level of deference in …

Alj Final Orders On Appeal: Balancing Independence With Accountability, Jim Rossi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This essay addresses how ALJ final order authority in many state systems of administrative governance (among them Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and South Carolina) poses a tension between independence and accountability. It is argued that political accountability is sacrificed where reviewing courts defer to ALJ final orders on issues of law and policy. Standards of review provide state courts with a way of restoring the balance between independence and accountability, but reviewing courts should heighten the deference they give to the agency's legal and policy positions -- giving little or no deference to the ALJ on these issues -- even where …