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Vanderbilt University Law School

Journal

2017

Judicial selection

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Introduction: The Effects Of Selection Method On Public Officials, Clayton J. Masterman Nov 2017

Introduction: The Effects Of Selection Method On Public Officials, Clayton J. Masterman

Vanderbilt Law Review

State and local governments have long struggled to design optimal mechanisms for selecting public officials. Centuries of experimentation have left us with several techniques: election (partisan or otherwise), political appointment, or selection by some kind of technocratic commission. Despite our extensive experience with these systems, no consensus has emerged as to which system is best under what circumstances. Several questions remain unclear: What effect does selection method have on the quality of services that public officials provide? Does selection method systematically affect the ideological composition of officials? If so, does that effect matter? And what determines whether a jurisdiction adopts …


Judicial Reform As A Tug Of War: How Ideological Differences Between Politicians And The Bar Explain Attempts At Judicial Reform, Adam Bonica, Maya Sen Nov 2017

Judicial Reform As A Tug Of War: How Ideological Differences Between Politicians And The Bar Explain Attempts At Judicial Reform, Adam Bonica, Maya Sen

Vanderbilt Law Review

What predicts attempts at judicial reform? We develop a broad, generalizable framework that both explains and predicts attempts at judicial reform. Specifically, we explore the political tug of war created by the polarization between the bar and political actors, in tandem with existing judicial selection mechanisms. The more liberal the bar and the more conservative political actors, the greater the incentive political actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection. (And, vice versa, the more conservative the bar and the more liberal political actors, the greater incentive political actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection.) Understanding this …