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The Interpretive Dimension Of Seminole Rock, Kevin M. Stack Jan 2015

The Interpretive Dimension Of Seminole Rock, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A lively debate has emerged over the deferential standard of review courts apply when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. That standard, traditionally associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and now more frequently attributed to Auer v. Robbins, states that a court must accept an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." This Article argues that a court's choice of method for interpreting regulations” including how it determines which agency interpretations are inconsistent with the regulation ” may be just as important, if not more …


Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, William Weaver Jan 2014

Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, William Weaver

Vanderbilt Law Review

Congress frequently delegates to agencies, and a host of Supreme Court decisions have articulated tests for determining what level of deference courts should give to agency interpretations of their statutory directives. Courts have historically undertaken these analyses in the context of a single agency. Congressional authorization of joint rulemaking authority is more complicated, however, and the traditional frameworks for review are inadequate.

When Congress delegates authority to multiple agencies, courts should review the agencies' rules with heightened deference. The traditional framework for judicial review of agency rules is ill equipped when rules are promulgated by multiple coordinated agencies. The prevalence …


Reclaiming The Legal Fiction Of Congressional Delegation, Lisa Schultz Bressman Jan 2009

Reclaiming The Legal Fiction Of Congressional Delegation, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations is based on a legal fiction – namely, that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. Critics argue that the fiction is false because Congress is unlikely to think about the delegation of interpretive authority at all, or in the way that the Court imagines. They also contend that the fiction is fraudulent because the Court does actually care about whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority in any particular instance, but applies a presumption triggered by statutory ambiguity or a particularized analysis involving factors unrelated to congressional delegation. In …


How "Mead" Has Muddled Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Lisa S. Bressman Oct 2005

How "Mead" Has Muddled Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Lisa S. Bressman

Vanderbilt Law Review

When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mead Corp. four years ago, Justice Scalia predicted that judicial review of agency action would devolve into chaos. This Article puts that prediction to the test by examining the court of appeals decisions applying the decision. Justice Scalia actually understated the effect of Mead. This Article suggests a remedy for the mess.

In Mead, the Court held that an agency is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC only if Congress has delegated to that agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry the force of law, and the agency …


Judicial Review Of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, Lisa Schultz Bressman Jan 2004

Judicial Review Of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article contends that the current law governing judicial review of agency inaction, though consistent with the prevailing theory of agency legitimacy, is inconsistent with the founding principles of the administrative state. The Supreme Court's reluctance to allow judicial review of agency inaction reflects the popular view that agency decision-making should be subject foremost to the scrutiny of politically accountable officials. The difficulty is that even scholars who generally support this view of agency decision-making reject the Court's treatment of agency inaction. Yet these scholars have failed to appreciate the reason. The reason is that the founding principles of the …


Administrative Law -- 1956 Tennessee Survey, James B. Earle Aug 1956

Administrative Law -- 1956 Tennessee Survey, James B. Earle

Vanderbilt Law Review

Questions of the scope and timing of judicial review of administrative agency action were again before the courts during the period covered by this survey. Timing of Judicial Review: The problem of "timing" of judicial review of administrative action includes questions of the availability of administrative remedies and whether their exhaustion must be required before court action; ripeness for review, usually associated with the issuance of agency rules and regulations; and jurisdictional questions vis-a-vis the agency and the court.