Law Commons^™

Major Contradictions At The Roberts Court, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Roberts Court may well overturn the Chevron doctrine this Term, despite the affection for stare decisis that Chief Justice Roberts himself expressed in the related case of Kisor v. Wilkie. Against that backdrop, Professors Jodi Short and Jed Shugerman offer an analysis of why the Court’s major questions doctrine, a predecessor to interring Chevron, is inconsistent with another group of the Court’s opinions, which the authors describe as the Court’s presidentialism.

Their analysis is incisive. While addressed to a Court that has a rather cavalier attitude toward doctrinal coherence, the article’s convincing empirical evidence may encourage the Justices to …

Representative Rulemaking, Jim Rossi, Kevin Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The dominant form of lawmaking in the United States today-—notice-and-comment rulemaking—-is not a representative process. Notice-and-comment simply invites public participation, leaving the overall balance of engagement with the proposed regulations to the choices of individuals, public interest groups, trade groups, and regulated businesses. The result is a predictable one: In most rulemakings, industry voices dominate, and in many rulemakings, there is no participation by citizens or public interest groups. This representation deficit must be taken seriously. The basic rationales for a notice-and-comment rulemaking process depend upon some level of representation for those affected. The goal of providing the agency with …

Efficiency And Equity In Regulation, Caroline Cecot

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Biden Administration has signaled an interest in ensuring that regulations appropriately benefit vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. Prior presidential administrations since at least the Reagan Administration have focused on ensuring that regulations are efficient, maximizing the net benefits to society as a whole, without considering who benefits or who loses from these policies. Critics of this process of regulatory review have celebrated President Biden’s initiative, hoping that distributional analysis and the pursuit of equity will displace traditional tools and interests such as cost-benefit analysis and the pursuit of efficiency. Meanwhile, supporters of the current process are concerned that pursuing equity …

Chevron Is A Phoenix, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law Review

Judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own statutes is a foundational principle of the administrative state. It recognizes that Congress has the need and desire to delegate the details of regulatory policy to agencies rather than specify those details or default to judicial determinations. It also recognizes that interpretation under regulatory statutes is intertwined with implementation of those statutes. Prior to the famous decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court had long regarded judicial deference as a foundational principle of administrative law. It grew up with the administrative state alongside other foundational administrative law principles. In Chevron, the …

Fiduciary Duties And Corporate Climate Responsibility, Cynthia A. Williams

Vanderbilt Law Review

Corporate-law scholarship for decades has been occupied with agency costs and how to mitigate them. But when I teach the basic business organizations class, starting with agency law and looking at the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and full disclosure of any agent to her principal, we explore both costs and benefits of agency relationships. I do so by introducing Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm. Using an example close to most second-year law students’ experience, that of buying a suit for interviews, I contrast Brooks Brothers establishing its own factories (the “make” decision) with Brooks Brothers using supply chains, …

“Computer Says No!”: The Impact Of Automation On The Discretionary Power Of Public Officers, Doa A. Elyounes

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

The goal of this Article is to unpack the “human in the loop” requirement in the process of automation. It will analyze the impact of automation on street-level bureaucrats and lay out the steps policy makers need to take into account to ensure that meaningful human discretion is maintained. This issue is examined by comparing two algorithms related to the use of automation to detect and investigate fraud in welfare benefits. The first algorithm is used by Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency for detecting and investigating unemployment fraud. This is a draconian algorithm with the ability to automatically decide to cut …

The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Robin H. Huang, Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical …

The Law And Practice Of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis Of China And The United States, Randall S. Thomas, Robin Hui Huang

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical …

Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons From The Public Company, Amanda M. Rose

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The agency relationship between class counsel and class members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is similar to that between executives and shareholders in U.S. public companies. This similarity has often been noted in class action literature, but until this Article no attempt has been made to systematically compare the approaches taken in these two settings to reduce agency costs. Class action scholars have downplayed the importance of the public company analogy because public companies are subject to market discipline and class actions are not. But this is precisely why the analogy is useful: because public companies are subject to market …

Agencies' Obligation To Interpret The Statute, Aaron Saiger

Vanderbilt Law Review

Conventionally, when a statute delegates authority to an agency, courts defer to agency interpretations of that statute. Most agencies and scholars view such deference as a grant of permission to the agency to adopt any reasonable interpretation. That is wrong, jurisprudentially and ethically. An agency that commands deference bears a duty to adopt what it believes to be the best interpretation of the relevant statute. Deference assigns to the agency, rather than to a court, power authoritatively to declare what the law is. That power carries with it a duty to give the statute the best reading the agency can. …

Agencies Running From Agency Discretion, J.B. Ruhl, Kyle Robisch

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Discretion is the root source of administrative agency power and influence, but exercising discretion often requires agencies to undergo costly and time-consuming pre-decision assessment programs, such as under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Many federal agencies thus have argued strenuously, and counter-intuitively, that they do not have discretion over particular actions so as to avoid such pre-decision requirements. Interest group litigation challenging such agency moves has led to a new wave of jurisprudence exploring the dimensions of agency discretion. The emerging body of case law provides one of the most robust, focused judicial examinations …

Judicial Review Of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, W. Kip Viscusi, Caroline Cecof

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article evaluates judicial review of agency benefit-cost analysis ("BCA") by examining a substantial sample of thirty-eight judicial decisions on agency actions that implicate BCA. Essentially, the Administrative Procedure Act tasks federal courts with ensuring that federal agency action is reasonable. As more agencies use BCA to justify their rulemakings, the court's duty often requires judges to evaluate the reasonableness of agency BCAs. In this Article, we discuss the challenges that trigger judicial review of agency BCAs and the standards that govern the review. We then present specific examples of how courts analyze BCAs. Overall, we find many examples of …

Agreement In Principle: A Compromise For Activist Shareholders From The Uk Stewardship Code, David W. Roberts

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

Equity ownership in the United States and Europe is now highly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which gives rise to new problems of agency and corporate governance. These large investment intermediaries, such as mutual funds, specialize in maximizing beneficial owner value based on short-term performance benchmarks but lack the expertise and incentive to actively engage corporate boards on business strategy and governance matters. Instead, institutional investors are "rationally reticent," meaning that they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to propose them. Activist shareholders may offer an endogenous solution to address "latent activism" in institutional intermediaries …

Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation. This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …

The Interpretive Dimension Of Seminole Rock, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A lively debate has emerged over the deferential standard of review courts apply when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. That standard, traditionally associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and now more frequently attributed to Auer v. Robbins, states that a court must accept an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." This Article argues that a court's choice of method for interpreting regulations” including how it determines which agency interpretations are inconsistent with the regulation ” may be just as important, if not more …

States, Agencies, And Legitimacy, Miriam Seifter

Vanderbilt Law Review

Scholarship on the administrative process has scarcely attended to the role that states play in federal regulation. This Article argues that it is time for that to change. An emerging, important new strand of federalism scholarship, known as "administrative federalism," now seeks to safeguard state interests in the administrative process and argues that federal agencies should consider state input when developing regulations. These ideas appear to be gaining traction in practice. States now possess privileged access to agency decisionmaking processes through a variety of formal and informal channels. And some courts have signaled support for the idea of a special …

Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, William Weaver

Vanderbilt Law Review

Congress frequently delegates to agencies, and a host of Supreme Court decisions have articulated tests for determining what level of deference courts should give to agency interpretations of their statutory directives. Courts have historically undertaken these analyses in the context of a single agency. Congressional authorization of joint rulemaking authority is more complicated, however, and the traditional frameworks for review are inadequate.

When Congress delegates authority to multiple agencies, courts should review the agencies' rules with heightened deference. The traditional framework for judicial review of agency rules is ill equipped when rules are promulgated by multiple coordinated agencies. The prevalence …

Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment Of The Pto, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article undertakes the first attempt to causally investigate the influence of funding on the United States Patent and Trademark Office's ("PTO") decisionmaking. More specifically, this Article studies the influence of the PTO's budgetary structure on the most important decision made by the Agency: whether or not to grant a patent. It begins by setting forth a theoretical model predicting that certain elements of the PTO's fee schedule, such as issuance and maintenance fees, which are only collected in the event that patents issue, create incentives for the PTO to grant additional patents. Using a rich database of previously unavailable …

Free Agents: Should Crowdsourcing Lead To Agency Liability For Firms?, Erin R. Frankrone

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

Crowdsourcing has emerged as a new production paradigm through which firms outsource traditional employee tasks to an undefined and generally large network of people, the "crowd," in the form of an open call. The relationships between the crowd and the firm vary across different crowdsourcing models and do not represent, either in fact or in theory, the employment or contractor relationships with which the law is familiar. Therefore, the law and the courts are ill-equipped to answer the questions of whether and how liability should attach to firms for the crowd's harmful conduct toward third parties. Agency law is the …

A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift over time; (2) these shifts can result in new …

Agency Coordination In Shared Regulatory Space, Jim Rossi, Jody Freeman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that inter-agency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance. It explains why lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to "share regulatory space," why these delegations are so pervasive and stubborn, and why consolidating or eliminating agency functions will not solve the problems they create. The Article describes a variety of tools that Congress, the President and the agencies can use to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal inter-agency agreements, and joint policymaking. The Article assesses the relative costs and benefits of these coordination tools, using the normative …

Agency Independence After Pcaob, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Separation of powers has a new endeavor. The PCAOB decision makes the validity of good-cause removal protections depend on the separation of adjudicative from policymaking and enforcement functions within the agency. At a minimum, within independent agencies, it preserves the second layer of removal protection only for dedicated adjudicators. But its logic extends further. In PCAOB, the demand for political supervision over rulemaking and enforcement trumped Congress's choice to preserve the independence of officials who perform those roles and also adjudicate. In that way, PCAOB reversed the consistent constitutional validation of good-cause removal protections for those who engage in adjudication. …

Common Agency And The Public Corporation, Paul Rose

Vanderbilt Law Review

Under the standard agency theory applied to corporate governance, active monitoring of manager-agents by empowered shareholder-principals will reduce agency costs created by management shirking and expropriation of private benefits. But while shareholder power may result in reduced managerial expropriation, an analysis of how that power is often exercised in public corporation governance reveals that it can also produce significant costs: influential shareholders may extract private benefits from the corporation, incur and impose lobbying expenses, and pressure corporations to adopt inapt corporate governance structures. These costs strain the simple principal-agent model on which shareholder empowerment is based. This Article offers an …

The Future Of Agency Independence, Lisa S. Bressman, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law Review

Independent agencies have long been viewed as different from executive-branch agencies because the President lacks authority to fire their leaders for political reasons, such as failure to follow administration policy. In this Article, we identify mechanisms that make independent agencies increasingly responsive to presidential preferences. We find these mechanisms in a context where independent agencies traditionally have dominated: financial policy. In legislative proposals for securing market stability, we point to statutorily mandated collaboration on policy between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. In administration practices for improving securities regulation, we focus on White House coordination of, …

The Consequences Of Congress's Choice Of Delegate: Judicial And Agency Interpretations Of Title Vii, Margaret H. Lemos

Vanderbilt Law Review

Although Congress delegates lawmaking authority to both courts and agencies, we know remarkably little about the determinants-and even less about the consequences-of the choice between judicial and administrative process. The few scholars who have sought to understand the choice of delegate have used formal modeling to illuminate various aspects of the decision from the perspective of the enacting Congress. That approach yields useful insight into the likely preferences of rational legislators, but tells us nothing about how (or whether) those preferences play out in the behavior of courts and agencies. Without such knowledge, we have no way of testing the …

The Future Of Agency Independence, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Independent agencies have long been viewed as different from executive-branch agencies because the President lacks authority to fire their leaders for political reasons, such as failure to follow administration policy. In this Article, we identify mechanisms that make independent agencies increasingly responsive to presidential preferences. We find these mechanisms in a context where independent agencies traditionally have dominated: financial policy. In legislative proposals for securing market stability, we point to statutorily mandated collaboration on policy between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury. In administration practices for improving securities regulation, we focus on White House coordination of, …

Obama's Equivocal Defense Of Agency Independence, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

You can't judge a President by his view of Article II. At the very least, only looking to a President's construction of Article II gives a misleading portrait of the actual legal authority recent Presidents have asserted.

President Obama is no exception, as revealed by his defense of the constitutionality of an independent agency from challenge under Article II in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board' (PCAOB) in the Supreme Court this term. The PCAOB is an independent agency, located inside the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), created to regulate accounting of public companies in the wake of …

The Ncaa Rules Adoption, Interpretation, Enforcement, And Infractions Processes: The Laws That Regulate Them And The Nature Of Court Review, Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This article takes a comprehensive look at how the NCAA is organized, describes the NCAA committee structure, and explains how the NCAA in its multitude of roles does its work. The article focuses particularly on the NCAA by law interpretation process and the policies, procedures, and scope of authority of the enforcement, infractions, and student-athlete reinstatement processes. In its description of the division of responsibility among enforcement, infractions and student-athlete reinstatement, the article emphasizes the independence of each. The article then assesses the functions and structure of the NCAA in light of the preogatives of a private, multi-state association and …

Agency Statutory Interpretation And Policymaking Form, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this short symposium contribution, I take up this invitation to examine the relevance of the agency's policymaking form to its approach to statutory interpretation. The core point I wish to advance is a relatively basic one--namely, that an agency's approach to statutory interpretation is in part a function of the policymaking form through which it acts. My strategy is to examine two of the most important policymaking forms--notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication--and to argue that the considerations that distinguish agency and judicial interpretation have a markedly different place in these two agency policymaking forms. For purposes of exposition, I …

Reclaiming The Legal Fiction Of Congressional Delegation, Lisa Schultz Bressman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations is based on a legal fiction – namely, that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. Critics argue that the fiction is false because Congress is unlikely to think about the delegation of interpretive authority at all, or in the way that the Court imagines. They also contend that the fiction is fraudulent because the Court does actually care about whether Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority in any particular instance, but applies a presumption triggered by statutory ambiguity or a particularized analysis involving factors unrelated to congressional delegation. In …