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Full-Text Articles in Law
Issues And Outcomes, Guidance, And Indeterminacy: A Reply To Professor John Rogers And Others, David G. Post, Steven C. Salop
Issues And Outcomes, Guidance, And Indeterminacy: A Reply To Professor John Rogers And Others, David G. Post, Steven C. Salop
Vanderbilt Law Review
There is now a small but growing literature on the proper voting procedure for multijudge panels. Professor John Rogers began the most recent round of thinking about these vexing issues, arguing that a judge on a multimember panel should never "vote against the result of his or her own reasoning by deferring to a majority on a sub-issue on which the judge differs." We responded, arguing in favor of just such action, which we labeled "issue voting." We criticized Professor Rogers's preferred mode of multimember court adjudication, which we labeled "outcome voting," on the grounds that it provided limited guidance …
The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.
"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We respond to Professor Lynn A. Baker's criticisms of our article, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Professor Baker fundamentally misunderstands our measure of Supreme Court voting power. Moreover, she erroneously presumes that the "median Justice" wields the bulk of the Court's power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice. We conclude with a clarification of the median voter theorem and its implications for the distribution of voting power within the Supreme Court.