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Full-Text Articles in Law
Popular Constitutional Argument, Tom Donnelly
Popular Constitutional Argument, Tom Donnelly
Vanderbilt Law Review
Critics have long attacked popular constitutionalists for offering few clues about how their theory might work in practice—-especially inside the courts. These critics are right. Popular constitutionalism—as a matter of both theory and practice—remains a work in progress. In this Article, I take up the challenge of developing an account of (what I call) popular constitutional argument. Briefly stated, popular constitutional argument is a form of argument that draws on the American people’s considered judgments as a source of constitutional authority—akin to traditional sources like text, history, structure, and doctrine. Turning to constitutional theory, I situate popular constitutional argument within …
The Imaginary Constitution, Suzanna Sherry
The Imaginary Constitution, Suzanna Sherry
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
How many ways can conservatives spin an originalist tale to support their deregulatory, small-government vision? The answer is apparently infinite. In a new book, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman are the latest in a long line of scholars who insist that the real original meaning of the Constitution demands unwinding the regulatory state and substantially limiting the power of the federal government. They argue that the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, specifically a power of attorney. After summarizing the book, this essay turns to three of its most important failings, each of which serves to make the book a work …
Debating The Past's Authority In Alabama, Sara Mayeux
Debating The Past's Authority In Alabama, Sara Mayeux
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
With some exceptions, the major project of civil rights litigators today is not forward movement but the work of preserving as much as possible the gains of the 1960s against legal and political battering.29 Meanwhile, and ironically, the rise of conservative progress metanarratives reflects the achievement of both liberal and radical scholars of forcing into mainstream discourse greater recognition of the evils of slavery and Jim Crow. Respectable conservatives now join in denouncing the most flagrant forms of racial terror running through the American past (pace certain allies of the Trump Administration). But doing so places them in a bind, …
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Vanderbilt Law Review
There is longstanding tension between originalism and judicial precedent. With its resolute focus on deciphering the enacted Constitution, the originalist methodology raises questions about whether judges can legitimately defer to their own pronouncements. Numerous scholars have responded by debating whether and when the Constitution's original meaning should yield to contrary precedent. This Article considers the role of judicial precedent not when it conflicts with the Constitution's original meaning but rather when the consultation of text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a case. In those situations, deference to precedent can serve as a fallback rule of constitutional adjudication. The …
The Constitutionality Of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation And The History Of State Judicial Selection And Tenure, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
The Constitutionality Of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation And The History Of State Judicial Selection And Tenure, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Few questions in the field of Federal Courts have captivated scholars like the question of whether Congress can simultaneously divest both lower federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear federal constitutional claims and thereby leave those claims to be litigated in state courts alone. Such a divestiture is known today as “jurisdiction stripping,” and, despite literally decades of scholarship on the subject, scholars have largely been unable to reconcile two widely held views: jurisdiction stripping should be unconstitutional because it deprives constitutional rights of adjudication by independent judges and jurisdiction stripping is nonetheless perfectly consistent with …
The Origins And Limits Of Originalism: A Comparative Study, Ozan O. Varol
The Origins And Limits Of Originalism: A Comparative Study, Ozan O. Varol
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
In the debate about originalism in the United States, scholars have devoted scant attention to the question whether the United States stands alone in its fascination with originalism. According to the prevailing view, originalism is distinctively American and the study of comparative originalism is an oxymoron. This Article challenges that conventional view. Drawing on neglected Turkish-language sources, the Article analyzes, as a comparative case study, the use of originalism by the Turkish Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) to interpret the secularism provisions in the Turkish Constitution. Comparing the Turkish version of originalism to American originalism, the Article sheds light on broader …
Originalism And Summary Judgment, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Originalism And Summary Judgment, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has revolutionized modern criminal procedure by invoking the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to strike down several sentencing innovations. This revolution has been led by members of the Supreme Court who follow an "originalist" method of constitutional interpretation. Recent work by the legal historian Suja Thomas has raised the question whether a similar "originalist" revolution may be on the horizon in civil cases governed by the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial. In particular, Professor Thomas has argued that the summary judgment device is unconstitutional because it permits judges …
An Originalism For Foreign Affairs, Ingrid Wuerth
An Originalism For Foreign Affairs, Ingrid Wuerth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Legal scholarship on foreign affairs frequently focuses on the Constitution's text and original meaning, but generally does not fully engage debates about originalism as a method of modern constitutional interpretation. For its part, much of the scholarship defending originalism as a methodology has said little explicitly about foreign affairs. This short symposium contribution describes three contemporary normative arguments in favor of originalism - those advanced by Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport - and then considers their application to foreign affairs. It concludes that these arguments are at best underdeveloped and at worst weak when it …
The Divergence Of Constitutional And Statutory Interpretation, Kevin M. Stack
The Divergence Of Constitutional And Statutory Interpretation, Kevin M. Stack
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
There is a peculiar point of agreement between prominent defenders of originalist and dynamic interpretive methods, that their preferred interpretive approach applies not just to statutes or to the Constitution, but to both. In this Article, I challenge this shared position - as represented by Justice Antonin Scalia's originalist textualism and Professor William Eskridge's dynamic interpretive theory. I argue that the democratic and rule-of-law values that these theories invoke in fact suggest that different interpretive approaches govern constitutional and statutory interpretation. I contend, first, that disjunctures between the democratic justification for originalism in constitutional and statutory interpretation reveal the distinct …
Textualism And Judgment, Suzanna Sherry
Textualism And Judgment, Suzanna Sherry
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Textualism, like other foundationalist theories such as originalism, purports to be a grand theory of constitutional interpretation, answering all questions with the same single-minded and narrowly constrained technique. The inevitable result is a diminution of what one might call judgment. Judgment is what judges use to decide cases when the answer is not tightly constrained by some interpretive theory. It is an aspect of what others have called prudence, or pragmatism.' But if one has a theory of constitutional interpretation that is supposed to produce clear answers in a relatively mechanical way, there is little room for the exercise of …