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Full-Text Articles in Law
Against Political Theory In Constitutional Interpretation, Christopher S. Havasy, Joshua C. Macey, Brian Richardson
Against Political Theory In Constitutional Interpretation, Christopher S. Havasy, Joshua C. Macey, Brian Richardson
Vanderbilt Law Review
Judges and academics have long relied on the work of a small number of Enlightenment political theorists-—particularly Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone—-to discern meaning from vague and ambiguous constitutional provisions. This Essay cautions that Enlightenment political theory should rarely, if ever, be cited as an authoritative source of constitutional meaning. There are three principal problems with constitutional interpretation based on eighteenth-century political theory. First, Enlightenment thinkers developed distinct and incompatible theories about how to structure a republican form of government. That makes it difficult to decide which among the conflicting theories should possess constitutional significance. Second, the Framers did not write …
Reverse Political Process Theory, Aaron Tang
Reverse Political Process Theory, Aaron Tang
Vanderbilt Law Review
Despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the Supreme Court has long since stopped interpreting the Constitution to afford special protection to certain groups on the ground that they are powerless to defend their own interests in the political process. From a series of decisions reviewing laws that burden whites under the same strict scrutiny as laws that burden racial minorities, to the more recent same-sex marriage decision based principally on the fundamental nature of marriage (rather than the political status of gays and lesbians), it is now an uncontroversial observation that when it comes to applying the open-textured provisions of …
Book Reviews, Ernest Van Den Haag, James F. Neal
Book Reviews, Ernest Van Den Haag, James F. Neal
Vanderbilt Law Review
Consensual Government "The Morality of Consent" by Alexander M. Bickel
Reviewed by Ernest van den Haag
Bickel wanted to make the scope of the law comprehensive enough to proclaim the norms that are consensually perceived to be necessary to social life, yet to let individuals and groups pursue their choices without being forced to conform altogether to majority views or being strapped into judicial strait jackets. His work, and the unifying theme of this posthumous collection of essays, very largely consisted of elaborations of his answer to the question: how can we define the province of constitutional interpretation so as …