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Full-Text Articles in Law
Deconstructing Duty Free: Investor-State Arbitration As Private Anti-Bribery Enforcement, Andrew B. Spalding
Deconstructing Duty Free: Investor-State Arbitration As Private Anti-Bribery Enforcement, Andrew B. Spalding
Law Faculty Publications
Duty Free rests upon a kind of three-legged stool of legal argumentation. Those legs are: 1) the common law of contract; 2) principles of state liability for official misconduct; and 3) global anti-corruption policy. As this article will show, each leg of that stool is fundamentally flawed; the legal arguments are unpersuasive and occasionally incorrect. This article seeks to deconstruct that stool, exposing the fatal structural flaws in each leg. It thus clears the way for building an arbitral jurisprudence of corruption that actually does what Duty Free attempted: advance global anti-corruption policy in a way that will inure to …
Four Uncharted Corners Of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search Of Remedies To The Sanctioning Effect, Andrew B. Spalding
Four Uncharted Corners Of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search Of Remedies To The Sanctioning Effect, Andrew B. Spalding
Law Faculty Publications
This Article is the third installment in a long-term research project that examines the effects of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in relation to its underlying policy goals. It first reiterates the various data points showing that enforcement now has the unintended effect of reducing investment in higher-corruption markets. Because this amounts to the withdrawal of capital from developing countries in protest of their political conditions, I call this the "sanctioning effect." The paper then seeks to push the envelope of current anti-bribery debates by exploring connections to four fields of academic inquiry not typically associated with the FCPA. …
Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets,, Andrew B. Spalding
Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets,, Andrew B. Spalding
Law Faculty Publications
Although the purpose of international anti-bribery legislation, particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), is to deter bribery, empirical evidence demonstrates a problematic collateral effect. In countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively common, the present enforcement regime goes beyond the deterrence of bribery, and ultimately deters investment. Drawing on literature from political science and economics, this Article argues that anti-bribery legislation, as presently enforced, functions as de facto economic sanctions. A detailed analysis of the history of FCP A enforcement shows that these sanctions most often occur in emerging markets, where historic opportunities for economic and social …