Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics (6)
- Law and Economics (5)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (5)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (5)
- Sociology (5)
-
- Economic Policy (4)
- Economics (4)
- Securities Law (4)
- Work, Economy and Organizations (4)
- Law and Society (3)
- Legal Studies (3)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (2)
- Business and Corporate Communications (2)
- Corporate Finance (2)
- Economic Theory (2)
- Legal Theory (2)
- Administrative Law (1)
- American Politics (1)
- Business Analytics (1)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (1)
- Environmental Law (1)
- Environmental Policy (1)
- Finance and Financial Management (1)
- Labor Economics (1)
- Labor Relations (1)
- Labor and Employment Law (1)
- Law and Politics (1)
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, And Corporate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, Jonathan Klick, Robert H. Sitkoff
Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, And Corporate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, Jonathan Klick, Robert H. Sitkoff
All Faculty Scholarship
In July 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust’s investment portfolio by selling the Trust’s controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company’s stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for governor, opposed the sale on the ground that it would harm the local community. Shortly after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company’s stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study methodology, we find that the sale announcement …
Shareholder Democracy On Trial: International Perspective On The Effectiveness Of Increased Shareholder Power, Lisa Fairfax
Shareholder Democracy On Trial: International Perspective On The Effectiveness Of Increased Shareholder Power, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder democracy - efforts to increase shareholder power within the corporation - appears to have come of age, both within the United States and abroad. In the past few years, U.S. shareholders have worked to strengthen their voice within the corporation by seeking to remove perceived impediments to their voting authority. These impediments include classified boards, the plurality standard for board elections, and the inability to nominate directors on the corporation's ballot. Shareholders' efforts have also extended to seeking a voice on the compensation of corporate officers and directors. Advocates of shareholder democracy believe that such efforts are critical to …
On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch
On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Managerial Turn In Environmental Policy, Cary Coglianese
The Managerial Turn In Environmental Policy, Cary Coglianese
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton
Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Making The Corporation Safe For Shareholder Democracy, Lisa Fairfax
Making The Corporation Safe For Shareholder Democracy, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
This article considers the effect that increased shareholder activism may have on non-shareholder corporate stakeholders such as employees and consumers. One of the most outspoken proponents of increased shareholder power has argued that such increased power could have negative repercussions for other corporate stakeholders because it would force directors to focus on profits without regard to other interests. This article critically examines that argument. The article acknowledges that increased shareholder power may benefit some stakeholders more than others, and may have some negative consequences. However, this article demonstrates that shareholders not only have interests that align with other stakeholders, but …