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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Causation Canon, Sandra F. Sperino Jan 2023

The Causation Canon, Sandra F. Sperino

Faculty Publications

It is rare to witness the birth of a canon of statutory interpretation. In the past decade, the Supreme Court created a new canon-the causation canon. When a statute uses any causal language, the Court will assume that Congress meant to require the plaintiff to establish "but-for" cause.

This Article is the first to name, recognize and discuss this new canon. The Article traces the birth of the canon, showing that the canon did not exist until 2013 and was not certain until 2020. Demonstrating how the Court constructed this new canon yields several new insights about statutory interpretation.

The …


The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining The Meaning Of Jurisdiction, Erin Morrow Hawley May 2015

The Supreme Court's Quiet Revolution: Redefining The Meaning Of Jurisdiction, Erin Morrow Hawley

Faculty Publications

Over the last three decades, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have carried out a quiet revolution in the nature and meaning of jurisdiction. Historically, federal courts generally treated procedural requirements, like filing deadlines and exhaustion prerequisites, as presumptively "jurisdictional. "In case after case, the modern Court has reversed course. The result has been an unobtrusive but seminal redefinition of what jurisdiction means to begin with: the adjudicatory authority of the federal courts. This shift is momentous, but it has been obscured by the Court's erstwhile imposition of a clear statement requirement. For courts to find a statutory requirement jurisdictional, Congress …


Supreme Court's 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This Justice Scalia's Court?, Rafael Gely Jan 2003

Supreme Court's 2002 Term Employment Law Cases: Is This Justice Scalia's Court?, Rafael Gely

Faculty Publications

In a recent article,' Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the Supreme Court's constitutional law decisions of the 2002 Term "cannot be explained by any overarching theory or underlying set of interpretative principles." Instead, he argues, "constitutional law is all about value choices made by the Justices." Professor Chemerinsky also argues that given the current composition of the Court, "it is the value choices of the middle" - Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy - that matter the most. Professor Chemerinsky ends his article with the assertion that "[f]or better or worse, this really is the O'Connor Court." In reviewing the cases decided …


Supreme Court Employment Law Cases 2001-02 Term, Rafael Gely Jan 2002

Supreme Court Employment Law Cases 2001-02 Term, Rafael Gely

Faculty Publications

I set two simple objectives for the article. First, the article will summarize each of the cases. My intent is to provide those unfamiliar with the cases a brief review of the facts and a summary of the Court's reasoning. Parts II through VI provide this discussion, grouping the cases by subject area. Second, in Part VII, the article provides a "big picture" analysis of the various cases. My intent is to identify trends, issues, interesting aspects and features of the Court's term. My objective is to aid in our understanding of the patterns that might affect the Court's treatment …


A Rational Choice Theory Of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions With Applications To The State Farm And Grove City Cases, Rafael Gely, Pablo T. Spiller Oct 1990

A Rational Choice Theory Of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions With Applications To The State Farm And Grove City Cases, Rafael Gely, Pablo T. Spiller

Faculty Publications

In this article we follow the recent developments of the modern theory of administrative agencies, by developing a rational choice theory of the Supreme Court. Our framework combines two of the main characteristics of this literature: namely, the rational choice modeling strategy with the notion that institutions matter in the design of public policy. We differ basically by modeling the Supreme Court as a self-interested, ideologically motivated institution, making its decisions subject not to the traditional legal rules of precedent, but to the constraints arising from the political interests of other institutions of government-namely, Congress and the President.