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Full-Text Articles in Law

Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai Feb 2010

Constitutional Borrowing, Nelson Tebbe, Robert L. Tsai

Michigan Law Review

Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …


Foreword: Loving Lawrence, Pamela S. Karlan Jun 2004

Foreword: Loving Lawrence, Pamela S. Karlan

Michigan Law Review

Two interracial couples. Two cases. Two clauses. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute outlawing interracial marriage. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas statute outlawing sexual activity between same-sex individuals. Each case raised challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


"How To Think About Equality." Review Of Sovereign Virtue: The Theory And Practice Of Equality, By R. Dworkin, Don Herzog Jan 2002

"How To Think About Equality." Review Of Sovereign Virtue: The Theory And Practice Of Equality, By R. Dworkin, Don Herzog

Reviews

Ronald Dworkin's' latest might well seem sharply discontinuous with his other work. The formal theoretical apparatus that kicks off the book is a forbiddingly abstract - some will say arcane - hypothetical auction, coupled with a hypothetical insurance market. There is simply nothing like it in Taking Rights Seriously, or A Matter of Principle, or Law's Empire, or Life's Dominion, or Freedom's Law. Then again, Dworkin first published the key papers on the auction some twenty years. ago and has never flagged, as far as I know, in his commitment to the basic project.2 Theorists have been waiting for the …


An Epilogue To The Age Of Pound, Thomas A. Green Jan 1996

An Epilogue To The Age Of Pound, Thomas A. Green

Articles

Doubts about the reality of criminal offenders' autonomy have sometimes played a role in the movement to abolish, or greatly reduce the reach of, the sanction of capital punishment.


Freedom And Criminal Responsibility In The Age Of Pound: An Essay On Criminal Justice, Thomas A. Green Jun 1995

Freedom And Criminal Responsibility In The Age Of Pound: An Essay On Criminal Justice, Thomas A. Green

Articles

The concept of freedom has two main aspects: political liberty and freedom of the will. I am concerned here with the latter, although - as these two aspects of freedom are not entirely unrelated to each other - I shall touch also on the former. Enough has been written from a philosophical perspective on the relationship between free will and the law that it is not easy to justify yet another such undertaking. But there may still be room for some informal observations on the manner in which doubts about the concept of freedom of the will affected discussion of …


Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog Jan 1994

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …


Beyond The Warren Court And Its Conservative Critics: Toward A Unified Theory Of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Donald A. Dripps Jun 1990

Beyond The Warren Court And Its Conservative Critics: Toward A Unified Theory Of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Donald A. Dripps

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I develops more fully the differences that divide liberal and conservative commentators on criminal procedure, taking special note of the series of Reports prepared by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy and published recently in the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Part II explains my disquiet with the suggestion that original-meaning jurisprudence ought to guide criminal procedure doctrine. Part II also defends the thesis that the fourteenth amendment protects the individual interest in freedom from unjust punishment, rather than any abstract interest in truth for its own sake. Part III considers two familiar controversies in criminal …


Authority And Value: Reflections On Raz's Morality Of Freedom, Donald H. Regan Jan 1989

Authority And Value: Reflections On Raz's Morality Of Freedom, Donald H. Regan

Articles

Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom1 is full of subtle, original, and thought provoking arguments. It also manifests abundantly Raz's philosophical good sense and sensitivity to the complexities of the moral life. These are reasons enough to class it with the handful of genuinely important books whose appearance in the last two decades has constituted a renaissance in political philosophy. But in my opinion, Raz has another, and even stronger claim on our attention: He comes closer to the truth about political morality than anyone has for nearly a century. (Possibly much longer, but we need not attempt to decide …


Egalitarianism And The Warren Court, Philip B. Kurland Mar 1970

Egalitarianism And The Warren Court, Philip B. Kurland

Michigan Law Review

As late as 1966, an English philosopher could say that the word "equality," unlike the words "freedom," "liberty," and "justice," was not a "value word" but only a descriptive one. He was not denigrating the term or the concept. He was saying that "when people talk about equality in a political or moral context what they really mean to talk about is some closely evaluative concept, such as impartiality or justice." What may have been true in England in 1966 was only partially true in the United States. While the word "equality" may still be used here to invoke other …