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Articles 1 - 20 of 20
Full-Text Articles in Law
Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, And The Best View Of The Law, W. Bradley Wendel
Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, And The Best View Of The Law, W. Bradley Wendel
Michigan Law Review Online
What interests me, as a scholar of legal ethics and jurisprudence, is whether Yates got it right when she said the responsibility of a lawyer for the government is to seek justice and stand for what is right, and that the position of the Department of Justice should be informed by the lawyer’s best view of the law. Yates’s claim that legal advice should be informed by the best view of the law sounds very much like the position of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin argued that a judge should determine the legal rights and duties of the litigants by constructing the …
The End Of Jurisprudence, Scott Hershovitz
The End Of Jurisprudence, Scott Hershovitz
Articles
For more than forty years, jurisprudence has been dominated by the HartDworkin debate. The debate starts from the premise that our legal practices generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal, and the question at issue is how the content of these rights and obligations is determined. Positivists say that their content is determined ultimately or exclusively by social facts. Anti-positivists say that moral facts must play a part in determining their content. In this Essay, I argue that the debate rests on a mistake. Our legal practices do not generate rights and obligations that are distinctively legal. At best, …
The Model Of Plans And The Prospects For Positivism, Scott Hershovitz
The Model Of Plans And The Prospects For Positivism, Scott Hershovitz
Reviews
In Legality, Scott Shapiro builds his case for legal positivism on a simple premise: laws are plans. Recognition of that fact leads to legal positivism, Shapiro says, because the content of a plan is fixed by social facts. In this essay, I argue that Shapiro’s case for legal positivism fails. Moreover, I argue that we can learn important lessons about the prospects for positivism by attending to the ways in the argument fails. As I show, the flaws in Shapiro’s argument reveal structural problems with a family of prominent positivist views, including the one defended by Joseph Raz.
Cute Prickly Critter With Presbyopia, Don Herzog
Cute Prickly Critter With Presbyopia, Don Herzog
Reviews
Ronald Dworkin's' latest, long-awaited, and most ambitious book is a puzzle. Truth in advertising first: despite the title, this isn't centrally a book about justice. It's a book about the realm of value-all of that realm. Dworkin is most interested here in morality, but really touches on all of it, as a matter of the application of the abstract argument and sometimes in black and white right on the page, from aesthetics to prudence to morality to politics to law to . . . . It's fun to read, also frustrating. It stretches out lazily in handling some issues but …
On Dworkin And Borkin, Tom Lininger
On Dworkin And Borkin, Tom Lininger
Michigan Law Review
This Essay will use Dworkin's and Davis's scholarship as a jumping-off point for a discussion of the Supreme Court nomination process. I argue that while Dworkin's and Davis's books, when read together, expose a significant problem with the current nomination process, a possible solution to this predicament may lie in a change to the judicial code of ethics and the procedural rules for confirmation of judges. My analysis will proceed in four steps. Part I will address Dworkin's arguments. Part II will evaluate the analysis and evidence in Davis's book. Part III will consider an additional variable to which neither …
The Multistate Bar Exam As A Theory Of Law, Daniel J. Solove
The Multistate Bar Exam As A Theory Of Law, Daniel J. Solove
Michigan Law Review
What is the most widely read work of jurisprudence by those in the legal system? Is it H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law? Ronald Dworkin's Law's Empire? No. It is actually the Multistate Bar Exam ("Bar Exam"). Perhaps no other work on law has been so widely read by those in the legal profession. Although the precise text of the Bar Exam is different every year, it presents a jurisprudence that transcends the specific language of its text. Each year, thousands of lawyers-to-be ponder over it, learning its profound teachings on the meaning of the law. They study …
Attitudes About Attitudes, Michael J. Gerhardt
Attitudes About Attitudes, Michael J. Gerhardt
Michigan Law Review
Attitudes about the Supreme Court differ sharply, particularly among academics. Law professors believe the Constitution and other laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do not. These different perspectives on justices' fidelity to the law ensure that legal scholars and political scientists have little to say about the Court that is of interest to each other. As a result, it should not be surprising that most legal scholars are unfamiliar with Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, the two political scientists most closely associated with the view that the law does not constrain the justices from voting their policy preferences. …
Meaning's Edge, Love's Priority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Meaning's Edge, Love's Priority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan
Michigan Law Review
The story is told of an American wending his way through the British Museum. Reaching the Rosetta Stone, he reached right over the railing, touched the scarred slab, and lamented: "It doesn't feel meaningful." Whereupon an old Briton was heard to mumble: "The poor American's got this old thing confused with the Blarney Stone." A bully presses his case, but meaning is much more modest. Powerless to insist upon itself, meaning lies in wait of discovery. What distinguishes the Rosetta Stone from other rocks of the same kind and size is that it was someone's - or rather a group's …
Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule
Interpretation And Institutions, Cass R. Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule
Michigan Law Review
Suppose that a statute, enacted several decades ago, bans the introduction of any color additive in food if that additive "causes cancer" in human beings or animals. Suppose that new technologies, able to detect low-level carcinogens, have shown that many potential additives cause cancer, even though the statistical risk is often tiny - akin to the risk of eating two peanuts with governmentally-permitted levels of aflatoxins. Suppose, finally, that a company seeks to introduce a certain color additive into food, acknowledging that the additive causes cancer, but urging that the risk is infinitesimal, and that if the statutory barrier were …
"How To Think About Equality." Review Of Sovereign Virtue: The Theory And Practice Of Equality, By R. Dworkin, Don Herzog
Reviews
Ronald Dworkin's' latest might well seem sharply discontinuous with his other work. The formal theoretical apparatus that kicks off the book is a forbiddingly abstract - some will say arcane - hypothetical auction, coupled with a hypothetical insurance market. There is simply nothing like it in Taking Rights Seriously, or A Matter of Principle, or Law's Empire, or Life's Dominion, or Freedom's Law. Then again, Dworkin first published the key papers on the auction some twenty years. ago and has never flagged, as far as I know, in his commitment to the basic project.2 Theorists have been waiting for the …
Pragmatism Regained, Christopher Kutz
Pragmatism Regained, Christopher Kutz
Michigan Law Review
Jules Coleman's The Practice of Principle serves as a focal point for current, newly intensified debates in legal theory, and provides some of the deepest, most sustained reflections on methodology that legal theory has seen. Coleman is one of the leading legal philosophers in the Anglo-American world, and his writings on tort theory, contract theory, the normative foundations of law and economics, social choice theory, and analytical jurisprudence have been the point of departure for much of the most interesting activity in the field for the last three decades. Indeed, the origin of this book lies in Oxford University's invitation …
Positivism, Emergent And Triumphant, Vincent A. Wellman
Positivism, Emergent And Triumphant, Vincent A. Wellman
Michigan Law Review
Positivism is one of those words that triggers passionate and often contradictory responses. For some, positivism is a pejorative. Lon Fuller, perhaps more than anyone, charged that positivism was confused about the nature of law, blind to law's inherent morality, and morally corrupting to boot. He even suggested, in different ways, that positivism helped promote the rise of fascism in Europe. Others, in contrast, have treated positivism as a modest and undeniable truth about law. Law, they argued, is morally fallible, and accordingly, the existence and validity of law is a matter of social fact rather than moral necessity. H.L.A. …
Of Two Minds About Law And Minds, Larry Alexander
Of Two Minds About Law And Minds, Larry Alexander
Michigan Law Review
Present-oriented interpretation is an interpretive approach to legal texts that assigns them the best meaning, in terms of contemporary social policy, that they could plausibly convey were they written today rather than at the actual times of their enactment. Steven Smith has recently argued that present-oriented interpretation is a view of law in which law is literally "mindless." That is, present-oriented interpretation would have us be ruled by the fortuity of what present meanings the words of a text can bear, whereas, according to Smith, we should be ruled by what the enacting political authorities actually decided furthers the public …
Law Without Mind, Steven D. Smith
Law Without Mind, Steven D. Smith
Michigan Law Review
A large part of the work done by lawyers and judges involves the interpretation of enacted law - primarily, statutes and the Constitution. Not surprisingly, legal scholars offer a good deal of advice, usually unsolicited, about how the task of interpretation should be performed. At present, such scholarly advice commonly recommends variations on an approach that may be called "present-oriented interpretation." This approach discourages judges from equating a law with its historical meaning or "original understanding." Instead, it urges them to construe statutes and constitutional provisions in a way that will render the law "the best it can be" in …
Dworkin's Domain, Philip E. Soper
Dworkin's Domain, Philip E. Soper
Reviews
No one has done more in the last twenty years to revitalize debates about how judges should and do decide cases than Ronald Dworkin. At the same time, no one has been more equivocal than Dworkin in explaining how a theory of adjudication bears on the dispute within legal theory about the connection between law and morality. This fine book continues both traditions.
Alternative Methodologies In Contemporary Jurisprudence: Comments On Dworkin, Philip E. Soper
Alternative Methodologies In Contemporary Jurisprudence: Comments On Dworkin, Philip E. Soper
Articles
I have two brief points to make. Both involve recent developments in jurisprudence, by which I mean by and large the subject that Ronald Dworkin has just been discussing. Indeed, the first point is little more than an acknowledgement of the debt that is owed to Dworkin, not only for his specific contributions to this field, but for the implications of his work for law teaching generally.
Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, Philip Soper
Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, Philip Soper
Book Chapters
Confronted with standards beyond those obvious in purpose and rule, the positivist, says Dworkin, has two choices. He must either claim that such standards are only discretionary and hence not legally binding, or he may concede their binding status and argue that he identifies them as legal standards through reference, in some more complex way, to his theoretical master test.
There is, however, a third possibility. The positivist might admit that some standards bind judges but explain that they play a role in the legal system sufficiently different from that of ordinary rules and principles to justify excluding them from …
Glosses On Dworkin: Rights, Principles, And Policies, Donald H. Regan
Glosses On Dworkin: Rights, Principles, And Policies, Donald H. Regan
Articles
A great many people have attempted to explain what is wrong with the views of Ronald Dworkin. So many, indeed, that one who read only the critics might wonder why views so widely rejected have received so much attention. One reason is that, whatever may be wrong in Dworkin's theories, there is a good deal that is right in them. But what is right is not always clear. Important passages in Dworkin can be distressingly obscure, or tantalizingly incomplete. This essay is a set of loosely connected observations on themes from Dworkin. While I shall add some criticisms of my …
Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, E. Philip Soper
Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, E. Philip Soper
Michigan Law Review
This article offers a review of the Hart-Dworkin dispute and a qualified defense of the positivist's model against Dworkin's attack. The defense is cast primarily in the form of the second possible response to a descriptive theory: Dworkin's attack fails, I suggest, because it involves descriptive claims that can be accommodated to the positivist's conceptual theory regardless of one's view about the plausibility of those claims.
Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", Michigan Law Review
Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues that the rights thesis is untenable. It shows that Dworkin's distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of policy, upon which the rights thesis is based, cannot withstand close scrutiny. The Note questions whether it is sensible to speak of an objectively soundest theory of law, and argues that, even if such a theory is feasible, Dworkin has failed to prove that it will always dictate a unique result (or, put in different words, that the rights thesis is part of the putative soundest theory). If Dworkin's idea of a soundest theory is oppugned, or if the …