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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Michigan Law Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
An Insurmountable Obstacle: Denying Deference To The Bia’S Social Visibility Requirement, Kathleen Kersh
An Insurmountable Obstacle: Denying Deference To The Bia’S Social Visibility Requirement, Kathleen Kersh
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
In the last fifteen years, the Board of Immigration Appeals has imposed a requirement that persons seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group must establish that the social group is “socially visible” throughout society. This Comment argues that the social visibility requirement should be denied administrative deference on several grounds. The requirement should be denied Chevron deference because Congress’s intent behind the Refugee Act of 1980 is clear and unambiguous and, alternatively, the requirement is an impermissible interpretation of the statute. The requirement is also arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act. This Comment argues that …
Do Investment Treaties Prescribe A Deferential Standard Of Review, Anna T. Katselas
Do Investment Treaties Prescribe A Deferential Standard Of Review, Anna T. Katselas
Michigan Journal of International Law
The dramatic rise in foreign investment in recent decades has brought with it a corresponding increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and, in turn, the number of international investment disputes arising under those treaties. Investment treaty arbitration is the predominant method used to settle those disputes and has certain advantages for both foreign investors and host states compared to available alternatives, but it can tread on delicate issues typically within the domaine rieservd of states. The concern about due regard for sovereign interests in this context is far from purely academic. In the past twenty years, the …
The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs
The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs
Michigan Law Review
This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the single-scheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow controversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme exception as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at Chevron's second step.