Law Commons^™

Costs, Norms, And Inertia: Avoiding An Anticommons For Proprietary Research Tools, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Book Chapters

A decade ago the scientific community was sounding alann bells about the impact of intellectual property on the ability of scientists to do their work. Protracted negotiations over access to patented mice and genes, scientific databases, and tangible research materials all pointed toward the same conclusion: that intellectual property claims were undennining traditional sharing norms to the detriment of science. Michael Heller and I highlighted one dimension of this concern: that too many intellectual property rights in 'upstream' research results could paradoxically restrict 'downstream' research and product development by making it too costly and burdensome to collect all the necessary …

Patent Pools, Rand Commitments, And The Problematics Of Price Discrimination, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

The social welfare problematics of patent pooling by competitors are well known. Competitor patent pooling has the potential to create powerful efficiencies by eliminating holdout problems and blocking positions and reducing transactions costs from licensing negotiations. At the same time, competitors can use patent pools to cartelize in a variety of ways, for example by fixing prices, entrenching patents of dubious validity, and discouraging rivalry for innovation. Determining legal norms capable of capturing the efficiencies without enabling cartels has not proven easy.

Perhaps because of the practical difficulty of separating pro-competitive from anticompetitive pools, antitrust scrutiny has swung from extreme …