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Full-Text Articles in Law

Wrongs Without Rights. Review Of Wrongs, Rights, And Third Parties, By N. Cornell., Scott Hershovitz Jan 2017

Wrongs Without Rights. Review Of Wrongs, Rights, And Third Parties, By N. Cornell., Scott Hershovitz

Reviews

The word “wrong” is the source of much confusion, in part because it does double duty. “You set the table wrong,” I might say, noting that you’ve misplaced the forks and knives. When I say that, I imply that there’s a standard against which place settings are properly judged, and that you’ve mucked things up by failing to match it. This use of the word “wrong” pops up all over the place: “You took a wrong turn.” “That’s the wrong answer.” “Why do I get everything wrong?” But there’s another way to use the word “wrong”: “You wronged Tom,” I …


The Kerr Principle, State Action, And Legal Rights, Donald J. Herzog Jan 2007

The Kerr Principle, State Action, And Legal Rights, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

A Baltimore library refused to admit Louise Kerr to a training program because she was black. Not that it had anything against blacks, but its patrons did. When Kerr launched a civil suit against the library alleging a violation of equal protection of the laws, the courts credited the library's claim that it had no racist purpose, but Kerr still prevailed-even though the case occurred before Title VII and Brown v. Board of Education. Here a neutral and generally applicable rule ("serve the patrons"), when coupled with particular facts about private parties (the white patrons dislike blacks), yielded an …


Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog Jan 1994

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …


Talking About Rights, Carl E. Schneider May 1992

Talking About Rights, Carl E. Schneider

Reviews

In recent years, a growing recognition of the power of rights talk in American law and life has surfaced in the writing of legal academics, along with a gnawing doubt about that power. In Rights Talk The lmpaverishrnent of Political Discaurse, Mary Ann Glendon, a professor of law at Harvard University, gives those doubts systematic, thoughtful, and lucid expression. Glendon has long been one of our most penetrating students of family law and one of our most enlightening students of comparative law. In this book (as in its predecessor and forebear, Abartion and Divorce in We5tem Law), she brings this …


Glosses On Dworkin: Rights, Principles, And Policies, Donald H. Regan Aug 1978

Glosses On Dworkin: Rights, Principles, And Policies, Donald H. Regan

Articles

A great many people have attempted to explain what is wrong with the views of Ronald Dworkin. So many, indeed, that one who read only the critics might wonder why views so widely rejected have received so much attention. One reason is that, whatever may be wrong in Dworkin's theories, there is a good deal that is right in them. But what is right is not always clear. Important passages in Dworkin can be distressingly obscure, or tantalizingly incomplete. This essay is a set of loosely connected observations on themes from Dworkin. While I shall add some criticisms of my …


Right1, Right2, Right3, Right4 And How About Right?, Layman E. Allen Jan 1971

Right1, Right2, Right3, Right4 And How About Right?, Layman E. Allen

Book Chapters

Careful communication is frequently of central importance in law. The language used to communicate even with oneself in private thought profoundly influences the quality of that effort; but when one attempts to transmit an idea to another, language assumes even greater significance because of the possibilities for enormously distorting the idea. Word-skill is to be prized. Few have expressed this more aptly or succinctly than Wesley N. Hohfeld: ...[I]n any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or nonlegal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression.


Effect Of A Change In The Law Upon Rights Of Actions And Defences, Thomas M. Cooley Dec 1876

Effect Of A Change In The Law Upon Rights Of Actions And Defences, Thomas M. Cooley

Articles

A very interesting and important question frequently is, what effect has been produced upon a right of action, or upon a previously existing defence to an action, by a change in the law effected by statute after the right has accrued, or the cause of action has arisen, to which the defence was applicable. The question is encountered in a great variety of cases, and is sufficiently important to be considered under the several heads where the cases seem to range themselves. This is done imperfectly below.


Incidental Injuries From Exercise Of Lawful Rights, Thomas M. Cooley Dec 1875

Incidental Injuries From Exercise Of Lawful Rights, Thomas M. Cooley

Articles

In the present paper those cases will be considered in which one person suffers an injury in consequence of the exercise by another person of his legal rights. Many such cases occur in which, although the injury may be severe, the law will award no compensation, there being no tort in the case because there is an absence of that wrong the concurrence of which with damage is essential to an action. Negligence might supply the wrong, but we now speak of cases of which that is not an element.


Incidental Injuries From Exercise Of Lawful Rights, Thomas M. Cooley Dec 1875

Incidental Injuries From Exercise Of Lawful Rights, Thomas M. Cooley

Articles

In the present paper those cases will be considered in which one person suffers an injury in consequence of the exercise by another person of his legal rights. Many such cases occur in which, although the injury may be severe, the law will award no compensation, there being no tort in the case because there is an absence of that wrong the concurrence of which with damage is essential to an action. Negligence might supply the wrong, but we now speak of cases of which that is not an element.