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University of Michigan Law School

Journal

2013

Scientific evidence

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Adaptation And The Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, Kirsten Engel, Jonathan Overpeck Sep 2013

Adaptation And The Courtroom: Judging Climate Science, Kirsten Engel, Jonathan Overpeck

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

Climate science is increasingly showing up in courtroom disputes over the duty to adapt to climate change. While judges play a critical role in evaluating scientific evidence, they are not apt to be familiar with the basic methods of climate science nor with the role played by peer review, publication, and training of climate scientists. This Article is an attempt to educate the bench and the bar on the basics of the discipline of climate science, which we contend is a distinct scientific discipline. We propose a series of principles to guide a judge’s evaluation of the reliability and weight …


Making Method Visible: Improving The Quality Of Science-Based Regulation, Pasky Pascual, Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher Apr 2013

Making Method Visible: Improving The Quality Of Science-Based Regulation, Pasky Pascual, Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

Scientific inferences are theories about how the world works that scientists formulate based on their observations. One of the most difficult issues at the intersection of law and science is to determine whether the weight of evidence supports one scientific inference versus other competing interpretations of the observations. In administrative law, this difficulty is exacerbated by the behavior of both the courts and regulatory agencies. Agencies seldom achieve the requisite visibility that explains the analytical methods they use to reach their scientific inferences. Courts—because they appreciate neither the variety of inferential methods nor their epistemic foundations—do not demand this level …