Law Commons^™

The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.

Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's …

The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.

Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's …

The Case Against Section 1983 Immunity For Witnesses Who Conspire With A State Official To Present Perjured Testimony, Jennifer S. Zbytowski

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that witnesses who conspire with a state official to present perjured testimony at a judicial proceeding should not have absolute immunity from a section 1983 suit for damages. Part I provides background information on section 1983 and explains why a witness-state conspiracy satisfies the requirements of a section 1983 cause of action. Part I also summarizes the Supreme Court's doctrinal approach to section 1983 immunity. Finally, Part I examines two Supreme Court cases which are relevant to the issue of immunity for witness conspirators: Briscoe v. LaHue, and Malley v. Briggs. Part II applies the …

Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Confessions, Truth, and the Law by Joseph D. Grano

Improving Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Welsh S. White

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution by Craig M. Bradley

Privacy's Problem And The Law Of Criminal Procedure, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article addresses the connection between privacy-based limits on police authority and substantive limits on government power as a general matter. Part II briefly addresses the effects of that connection on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, both past and present. Part ID suggests that privacy protection has a deeper problem: it tends to obscure more serious harms that attend police misconduct, harms that flow not from information disclosure but from the police use of force. The upshot is that criminal procedure would be better off with less attention to privacy, at least as privacy is defined in …

Response: The Problems With Privacy's Problem, Louis Michael Seidman

Michigan Law Review

A Response to William J. Stuntz's "Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure"

Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow

Michigan Law Review

A Reply to Yale Kamisar's Response to the "Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause"

Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow

Michigan Law Review

In Part I of this article, we examine the global puzzle of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the local confusion or perversion lurking behind virtually every key word and phrase in the clause as now construed. In Part II we elaborate our reading of the clause and show how it clears up the local problems and solves the overall puzzle.

Reply, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

A Reply to Louis Michael Seidman's Response