Law Commons^™

Race-Ing Antitrust, Bennett Capers, Gregory Day

Michigan Law Review

Antitrust law has a race problem. To spot an antitrust violation, courts inquire into whether an act has degraded consumer welfare. Since anticompetitive practices are often assumed to enhance consumer welfare, antitrust offenses are rarely found. Key to this framework is that antitrust treats all consumers monolithically; that consumers are differently situated, especially along lines of race, simply is ignored.

We argue that antitrust law must disaggregate the term “consumer” to include those who disproportionately suffer from anticompetitive practices via a community welfare standard. As a starting point, we demonstrate that anticompetitive conduct has specifically been used as a tool …

The Impact Of Amex And Its Progeny On Technology Platforms, Kacyn H. Fujii

Michigan Law Review

Big Tech today faces unprecedented levels of antitrust scrutiny. Yet antitrust enforcement against Big Tech still faces a major obstacle: the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Ohio v. American Express. Popularly called Amex, the case imposed a higher initial burden on antitrust plaintiffs in cases involving two-sided markets. Two-sided markets connect two distinct, noncompeting groups of customers on a shared platform. These platforms have indirect network effects, meaning that one group of customers benefits when more of the second group of customers joins the platform. Two-sided markets are ubiquitous in the technology sector, encompassing social media, search engines, …

Reviving Antitrust Enforcement In The Airline Industry, Jonathan Edelman

Michigan Law Review

The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more aggressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers.

More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Although this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade …

Home-Field Disadvantage: How The Organization Of Soccer In The United States Affects Athletic And Economic Competitiveness, Carolina I. Velarde

Michigan Law Review

The United States men’s soccer team failed to qualify for the 2018 World Cup. In the aftermath, soccer followers questioned the organizational structure supervised by the United States Soccer Federation. An analysis of the relationships between professional soccer leagues reveals potentially anticompetitive practices that may contribute to the subpar performance of the U.S. Men’s National Team. This Note argues that the United States Soccer Federation is engaged in economically anticompetitive behavior that impedes the development of American soccer. Certain reforms, including an open-league system and player transfer fees at the youth development level, would enhance the economic and athletic competitiveness …

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester

Michigan Law Review

The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …

Shutting The Black Door: Using American Needle To Cure The Problem Of Improper Product Definition, Daniel A. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Section 1 of the Sherman Act is designed to protect competition by making illegal any agreement that has the effect of limiting consumer choice. To make this determination, courts first define the product at issue and then consider the challenged restraint's impact on the market in which that product competes. When considering § 1 allegations against sports leagues, courts have tended to define products according to the structure of the leagues. The result of this tendency is that harm to competition between the leagues' teams is not properly accounted for in the courts' analyses. This, in turn, grants leagues a …

Keeping The Door Ajar For Foreign Plaintiffs In Global Cartel Cases After Empagran, Jeremy M. Suhr

Michigan Law Review

In many ways, the Supreme Court's opinion of F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A. raised more questions than it answered. Growing out of the massive international vitamins cartel uncovered in the 1990s, Empagran presented a scenario in which all parties were foreign and all conduct occurred abroad. Although it is "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States," Empagran presented the Court with the first truly foreign antitrust case. It involved not only foreign conduct, but also foreign plaintiffs …

The Report Of The Attorney General's National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

In 1955, the third year of the Eisenhower administration, the Michigan Law Review published what I believe to be the only symposium on antitrust law ever to appear in its pages. The occasion was the release in March of that year of a Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,2 a nearly fourhundred- page examination of virtually all facets of federal antitrust doctrine and enforcement. The pages of the symposium led me of course to revisit the Report itself, a visit a little like seeing an old high school friend long forgotten some forty years …

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, And The Challenge Of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, Peter J. Hammer

Michigan Law Review

Should antitrust law ever sanction the accumulation of market power or permit other restraints of trade if such conduct would increase social welfare? This is the challenge raised by intramarket second- best tradeoffs. The lesson of second-best analysis is that one market failure can sometimes counteract the effects of another market failure. In the presence of multiple market failures, it is conceivable that mergers or other restraints traditionally viewed as anticompetitive may be welfare-enhancing. A social planner, given the mandate of maximizing total welfare, would permit such restraints. Could an antitrust judge come to the same result under a defensible …

Antitrust's Protected Classes, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

For purposes of argument, this essay assumes that efficiency ought to be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforcement. That premise is controversial. Nonetheless, several economic and legal theorists, primarily among the Chicago School of economics and antitrust scholarship, have developed an Optimal Deterrence Model based on this assumption. The Model is designed to achieve the optimum, or ideal, amount of antitrust enforcement. The Model's originators generally believe that there is too much antitrust enforcement, particularly enforcement initiated by private plaintiffs. I intend to show that, even if efficiency is the only antitrust policy goal, a broader array of lawsuits should …

Recognition Of The National Football League As A Single Entity Under Section 1 Of The Sherman Act: Implications Of The Consumer Welfare Model, Myron C. Grauer

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that Justice Rehnquist has analyzed the operational structure of the NFL in a manner that is consistent with proper antitrust enforcement policy, and expands upon the view that he espoused. It contends that the NFL is analogous to a law firm partnership, with the teams analogous to departments or partners that can make operating rules for the firm without fear of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. In arriving at the opposite conclusion, both the Oakland Raiders and NASL courts relied on several cases involving player restraints that presupposed that teams in professional sports leagues, such …

Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, Thomas E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective by Richard A. Posner

Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 Of The Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Section I of this Note analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court has implied a doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy. Section II then sets forth the theoretical and practical difficulties that such a doctrine entails. Section III, in turn, considers previous proposals for limiting the scope of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and examines their deficiencies. Finally, section IV presents an alternative analysis of the intra-enterprise conspiracy issue and proposes a standard for determining when application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to parent-subsidiary relations is inappropriate.

Territorial Restrictions And Per Se Rules--A Re-Evaluation Of The Schwinn And Sealy Doctrines, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Horizontal territorial restrictions have traditionally been said to be per se illegal. That is, they are illegal no matter what effect they may have on competition. The legality of vertical territorial restrictions, however, is still an unsettled issue. The past decade saw a trend toward considering such restrictions per se violations of section I of the Sherman Act. That trend culminated in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., a case better known for its speculation than its reasoning. The Supreme Court, which ostensibly announced the per se illegality of these restrictions in Schwinn, will have an opportunity …

The "Warren Court" And The Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, And Cynicism, Thomas` E. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

No one could quarrel with the simple assertion that the so-called "Warren Court" has had a significant, if indeed not extraordinary, impact on the development of the antitrust laws. It could hardly have been otherwise. The fifteen years since 1953 represent virtually one-fourth of the total history of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, and one fifth of the time which has elapsed since passage of the Sherman Act. Every Supreme Court decision under the 1950 amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act, the so-called antimerger law, has come after the accession of Chief Justice Warren to the …

Hawley: The New Deal And The Monopoly Problem, Arthur D. Austin

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The New Deal and the Monopoly Problem By E. W. Hawley

Boycotts And Restrictive Marketing Arrangements, Richard M. Buxbaum

Michigan Law Review

It is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleging that his termination was the result of a boycott. Boycotts-collective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a market-are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus, questions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance of the offender's market position do not arise.

American Bar Association Section Of Antitrust Law: Jury Instructions In Criminal Antitrust Cases, Ralph M. Carson

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Jury Instructions in Criminal Antitrust Cases by The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law

Antitrust Significance Of Covenants Not To Compete, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Covenants not to compete, despite their increasing prevalence and their obvious tendency to restrain competition, have seldom been attacked under either federal or state antitrust laws. In January 1965, however, William H. Orrick, Jr., then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, noted that the Division was becoming concerned about one aspect of the problem-the taking of overbroad covenants not to compete in connection with the purchase of a competitor. He suggested that such an agreement might have anticompetitive effects under either the Sherman Act or section 7 of the Clayton Act. This note will explore the present …

Phillips: Perspectives On Antitrust Policy, Edwin W. Tucker

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Perspectives on Antitrust Policy edited by Almarin Phillips

The Antitrust Expediting Act- A Critical Reappraisal, Robert C. Bonges

Michigan Law Review

The Expediting Act has been subject to some rather severe criticism from the bench and bar. At the extreme, it has been suggested that the act be repealed and the procedure for appealing government civil antitrust cases be completely overhauled. Even proponents of the act have acknowledged its need of revision, but there is little agreement among them on the extent and nature of desirable change. This comment will explore the origins, development, and current role of the Expediting Act in order to help determine what course revision, if it is needed, should follow.

Tying Arrangement With Trademark As The Tying Item Is Not A Per Se Violation Of The Antitrust Laws-Susser V. Carvel Corp., Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Several independent franchised soft ice-cream outlets brought suit for treble damages against Carvel Corporation, the franchising company, alleging that the contract between them constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The contract bound the dealers to purchase from Carvel-appointed suppliers all commodities sold as part of the retail dairy composite. Plaintiffs stipulated that they would rely on per se violations at trial. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show the alleged violations and, in any case, the defendant had proved …

Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, Milton Handler

Michigan Law Review

Ever since the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts have consistently refused to permit the requirements of antitrust to be circumvented by the easy expedient of dressing a sale in the vestments of a sham agency agreement. In Dr. Miles Medical, where the Supreme Court first held vertical price fixing unlawful, the seller and buyer denominated their agreement as an "agency," but the Court properly concluded that it was, in fact, a sale. Likewise, in Standard-Magrane, the first occasion on which the Court considered section of the Clayton Act, the seller purported to appoint his customers as …

Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws: The "Integrity Of The Product" Defense, F. Bruce Kulp Jr.

Michigan Law Review

One of the most frequently asserted defenses to an action under either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act against a tying arrangement-a contractual limitation imposed by a manufacturer whereby the purchaser of the "tying product" agrees to purchase a related "tied product" only from the manufacturer of the tying product-has been that the tying was necessary to protect the good will or the integrity of the tying product. Whether the tied product is service for the tying product, another component in a system in which the tying product is used, repair parts for the tying product, or any other …

Federal Criminal Procedure-Transfer For Trial Under Rule 21(B), F. David Trickey

Michigan Law Review

Defendant, a Delaware corporation, was indicted in the Eastern District of Illinois for violations of the Sherman Act. Proceeding under Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defendant moved to transfer the trial to the District of Minnesota, where its principal business offices were located. The parties stipulated that the alleged offenses occurred in both Illinois and Minnesota and submitted affidavits, briefs, and oral argument on the transfer motion to petitioner, the district court judge. While evaluating numerous other factors relevant to the transfer motion, the district court gave some weight to the contention of government counsel that …

Know-How Licensing And The Antitrust Laws, David R. Macdonald

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is to re-analyze the present antitrust status of know-how licensing for the purpose of clarifying the extent of the protection which the exploiter of know-how may accord himself without abusing the public interest in unfettered competition.

Antitrust-Clayton Act-Admissibilty Of Criminal Conviction Entered On A Plea Of Guilty As Prima Facie Evidence In Civil Suit For Treble Damage, Arthur M. Sherwood

Michigan Law Review

In a civil action for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the plaintiff sought to allege as prima facie evidence of a Sherman Act violation a criminal conviction entered on a plea of guilty by the defendant in an earlier prosecution by the government. The trial court sustained a motion by the defendant to strike from plaintiff's complaint any reference to the criminal prosecution. On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. A judgment entered on a plea of guilty is not a consent judgment within the meaning of the proviso to section 5(a) of the Clayton …

Federal Antitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating Of The "Failing Company" Doctrine In The Amended Section 7 Setting, Philip Sotiroff S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Even though application of section 7 has become increasingly effective, a specific exception to its coverage has been recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court. This exception is commonly referred to as the "failing company" doctrine. In short. the doctrine holds that an acquired or to-be-acquired firm which is in a "failing" condition, or the acquiring corporation, may interpose this condition as a defense to any prosecution under section 7 seeking to prevent or undo the acquisition of the failing company's stock or assets by the other. This discussion will attempt to explore the development of the doctrine, consider its …

Corporations-Officers And Directors-Liability For Representative Acts Under The Sherman Act, Leon E. Irish

Michigan Law Review

An indictment brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act charged appellee and the corporation that employed him with conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the greater Kansas City milk market. Appellee was charged solely, in his capacity as officer, director or agent of the corporation. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that natural persons are indictable under section 1 of the Sherman Act only for acts done on their own account. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded. A corporate officer is liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act whether …