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The First Word: The President's Place In "Legislative History", Kathryn Marie Dessayer
The First Word: The President's Place In "Legislative History", Kathryn Marie Dessayer
Michigan Law Review
This Note examines the extent to which courts interpreting statutes should consider presidential participation in the legislative process. Part I concludes that courts should afford presidential input greater weight in statutory interpretation given the constitutional foundations and the empirical reality of the President's involvement in the lawmaking process. This conclusion follows from an examination of the President's authority to propose legislation and his power to review legislation via the presentment clause. To demonstrate the advantages of using presidential documents, Part II considers a series of cases in which courts used executive documents in the statutory interpretation process. Although federal courts …
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Michigan Law Review
Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the government's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. Defendant Amorous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the admitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which criminalizes the knowing …
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Michigan Law Review
In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …