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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Doma: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of Fundamentalist Christianity, James M. Donovan Jan 1997

Doma: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of Fundamentalist Christianity, James M. Donovan

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

According to the text of the Act, DOMA's purposes are "to define and protect the institution of marriage," where marriage is defined to exclude same-sex partners. To be constitutionally valid under the Establishment Clause, this notion that heterosexual marriages require "protection" from gay and lesbian persons must spring from a secular and not religious source. This Article posits that DOMA has crossed this forbidden line between the secular and the religious. DOMA, motivated and supported by fundamentalist Christian ideology, and lacking any genuine secular goals or justifications, betrays the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.


Honesty, Privacy, And Shame: When Gay People Talk About Other Gay People To Nongay People, David L. Chambers, Steven K. Homer Jan 1997

Honesty, Privacy, And Shame: When Gay People Talk About Other Gay People To Nongay People, David L. Chambers, Steven K. Homer

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

There is a longstanding convention among lesbians and gay men in the United States: Do not reveal the sexuality of a gay person to a heterosexual person; unless you are certain that the gay person does not regard his sexuality as a secret. Lie if necessary to protect her secret. Violating the convention by "outing" another person is widely considered a serious social sin.


Naming The Grotesque Body In The "Nascent Jurisprudence Of Transsexualism", Richard F. Storrow Jan 1997

Naming The Grotesque Body In The "Nascent Jurisprudence Of Transsexualism", Richard F. Storrow

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

After a description of an analytical framework constructed of theories drawn from the writings of Mikhail Bahktin, Roland Barthes, and Sigmund Freud, this Article discusses the discrepancies in courts' use of medical authority in cases considering the rights of transsexuals and then analyzes courts' ultimate refusal to recognize transsexuals' psychological sex. The thrust of this Article is an examination of the forces compelling such inconsistencies. The result is an analysis which interweaves medical, juridical, psychological and mythic perspectives to disclose the underpinnings of courts' antipathy toward transsexuals.