Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Incentives (2)
- Actions (1)
- Automobiles (1)
- Automotive industry (1)
- Automotive parts (1)
-
- Boilerplate (1)
- Competitive bidding (1)
- Contract terms (1)
- Contracts (1)
- Copyright law (1)
- Copyright system (1)
- Cost liability (1)
- Damages (1)
- Deterrence (1)
- Drugs (1)
- Externalities (1)
- First copy (1)
- Language (1)
- Law journals (1)
- Law reviews (1)
- Law schools (1)
- Liability (1)
- Literature reviews (1)
- Manufacturers (1)
- Open access (1)
- Pharmaceuticals (1)
- Plaintiffs (1)
- Product liability (1)
- Recalls (1)
- Risk (1)
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Economics Of Open Access Law Publishing, Jessica D. Litman
The Economics Of Open Access Law Publishing, Jessica D. Litman
Articles
The conventional model of scholarly publishing uses the copyright system as a lever to induce commercial publishers and printers to disseminate the results of scholarly research. Recently, we have seen a number of high-profile experiments seeking to use one of a variety of forms of open access scholarly publishing to develop an alternative model. Critics have not quarreled with the goals of open access publishing; instead, they've attacked the viability of the open access business model. If we are examining the economics of open access publishing, we shouldn't limit ourselves to the question whether open access journals have fielded a …
The (Legal) Pains Of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make Products More Dangerous, Omri Ben-Shahar
The (Legal) Pains Of Vioxx: Why Product Liability Can Make Products More Dangerous, Omri Ben-Shahar
Articles
Comparing the experience of Vioxx and Celebrex leads Omri Ben-Shahar to think that stiff product liability has the perverse effect of inducing manufacturers of defective products to leave these products on the market, rather than withdraw them.
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, Margo Schlanger
Articles
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their liability exposure in a number of ways. Prior scholarship has dwelled primarily on the possibility that they may respond to the threat of liability by augmenting the amount of care they take.1 Defendants (I limit myself to defendants for simplicity) will increase their expenditures on care, so the theory goes, when those expenditures yield sufficient liability-reducing dividends; more care decreases liability exposure by simultaneously making it less likely that the actors will be found to have behaved tortiously in the event of an accident and …
Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White
Boilerplate And Economic Power In Auto Manufacturing Contracts, Omri Ben-Shahar, James J. White
Articles
This Article is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and conditions in the purchase orders of the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and highlights important differences in the substance of these boilerplate provisions. It argues that these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how tailoring occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects the terms that …