Law Commons^™

Against Creativity, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

According to the Supreme Court, copyright requires both independent creation and creativity. The independent creation requirement provides that copyright cannot protect an element of a work of authorship that is copied from a previously existing work. But scholars disagree about the meaning of and justification for the creativity requirement.

The creativity requirement should be abandoned because it is irrelevant to the scope of copyrightable subject matter and distorts copyright doctrine by encouraging inefficient “creativity rhetoric.” The purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of economically valuable works of authorship, not creativity.

Proving Disparate Impact In Fair Housing Cases After Inclusive Communities, Robert G. Schwemm, Calvin Bradford

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Disparate-impact claims under the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) are now a well-established part of housing discrimination law, having been recognized for decades by the lower courts and recently endorsed by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. The Court in Inclusive Communities saw the impact theory as a way of bolstering the FHA’s “role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society,” but it also set forth certain “cautionary standards” to guard against “abusive” impact claims. Under these standards, which are similar to those adopted in a 2013 HUD …

Brief Of Amici Curiae Professors Joshua A. Douglas And Michael E. Solimine, Election Law Scholars, In Support Of Petitioners, Joshua A. Douglas, Michael E. Solimine

Law Faculty Advocacy

Professor Joshua A. Douglas and Professor Michael E. Solimine are election law experts who have a particular interest in the procedural aspects of election litigation. Professors Douglas and Solimine are filing this brief because they have a keen interest in ensuring that the federal courts employ the proper procedure in election law cases, as doing so helps to resolve these disputes in a manner that best comports with the unique aspects of the electoral system. This brief explains why district courts should not use the pleading standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft …

Eldred & The New Rationality, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Historically, the rational basis test has been a constitutional rubber stamp. In Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court applied the rational basis test and respectively held that Congress could extend the copyright term of existing works and restore copyright protection of public domain works, despite evidence that Congress intended to benefit copyright owners at the expense of the public. But in Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court seems to have applied the rational basis test and held that state and federal laws were unconstitutional because they were motivated by …

Means And Ends In City Of Arlington V. Fcc: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft To Reshape The Scope Of Chevron Deference, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In last year's term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straightforward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article …

The Past, Present And Future Of Auer Deference: Mead, Form And Function In Judicial Review Of Agency Interpretations Of Regulations, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The law of judicial review of agency legal interpretations has undergone an important reshaping as a consequence of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp. That decision and the important follow-on decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Services have changed the understanding of the Court's landmark 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Chevron defined a new era of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but the Chevron era has itself been transformed.

These legal developments had seemed to have little consequential …

The Right To Vote Under State Constitutions, Joshua A. Douglas

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This Article provides the first comprehensive look at state constitutional provisions explicitly granting the right to vote. We hear that the right to vote is "fundamental," the "essence of a democratic society," and "preservative of all rights." But courts and scholars are still searching for a solution to the puzzle of how best to protect voting rights, especially because the U.S. Supreme Court has underenforced the right to vote. The answer, however, is right in front of us: state constitutions. Virtually every state constitution includes direct, explicit language granting the right to vote, as contrasted with the U.S. Constitution, which …

Procedural Predictability And The Employer As Litigator: The Supreme Court’S 2012-2013 Term, Scott R. Bauries

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In this contribution to the University of Louisville Law Review’s Annual Carl A. Warns Labor and Employment Institute issue, I examine the Supreme Court’s labor and employment-related decisions from the October Term 2012 (OT 2012). I argue that the Court’s decisions assisted employers as litigators—as repeat players in the employment dispute resolution system—in two ways. First, the Court established simple contract drafting strategies that employers may use to limit their exposure to employment claims. Second, the Court adopted bright-line interpretations of employment statutes. Both forms of assistance served a formalist interest in what I term “procedural predictability”—enhanced employer predictability and …

Election Law Pleading, Joshua A. Douglas

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This Article explores how the Supreme Court’s recent pleading decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have impacted election litigation. It explains how Twombly and Iqbal’s “factual plausibility” standard usually does not help in an election case, because there is often little factual dispute regarding the operation of the election practice. Instead, the real question in a motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff has stated a viable cause of action against the government defendant who is administering the election. But Twombly and Iqbal’s rule does not assist in answering this question. That is, Twombly and Iqbal are incongruent with …

Justice John Marshall Harlan: Professor Of Law, Brian L. Frye, Josh Blackman, Michael Mccloskey

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

From 1889 to 1910, while serving on the United States Supreme Court, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan taught at the Columbian College of Law, which became the George Washington University School of Law. For two decades, he primarily taught working-class evening students in classes as diverse as property, torts, conflicts of law, jurisprudence, domestic relations, commercial law, evidence-and most significantly-constitutional law.

Harlan's lectures on constitutional law would have been lost to history, but for the enterprising initiative-and remarkable note-taking-of one of Harlan's students, George Johannes. During the 1897-98 academic year, George Johannes and a classmate transcribed verbatim the twenty-seven …

Justice John Marshall Harlan: Lectures On Constitutional Law, 1897-98, Brian L. Frye, Josh Blackman, Michael Mccloskey

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

From 1889 to 1910, while serving on the United States Supreme Court, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan taught at the Columbian College of Law, which later became The George Washington School of Law. During the 1897–1898 academic year, one of Harlan’s students, George Johannes, along with a classmate, transcribed verbatim the twenty-seven lectures Justice Harlan delivered on constitutional law. In 1955, Johannes sent his copy of the transcripts to the second Justice Harlan, who eventually deposited them in the Library of Congress.

To create this annotated transcript of Justice Harlan’s lectures, Professor Frye purchased a microfilm copy of Johannes’s …

Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid And Coercion In National Federation Of Independent Business V. Sebelius, Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Kevin Outterson

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Until the 2011 Term, no Supreme Court decision since the New Deal had struck down an act of Congress as exceeding the federal spending power. The question of unconstitutionally coercive conditions was also novel. Indeed, no federal court had ever found any legislation to be an unconstitutionally coercive exercise of the spending power until the Court decided National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) on June 28, 2012. This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion in the context of the history and purpose of the Medicaid Act, paying particular attention to facts …

The Supreme Court And The Ppl Montana Case: Examining The Relationship Between Navigability And State Ownership Of Submerged Lands, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The United States Supreme Court held in PPL Montana v. Montana held that the State of Montana did not own the beds beneath certain rivers and, therefore, rejected the State's claim that the power company owed it millions of dollars in "back rent" for the use of the riverbeds as sites for ten of its hydroelectric power plants. The Montana Supreme Court, which had ruled in favor of the State, declared that even if portions of a river were not navigable for commercial purposes because of physical conditions, the entire river would be treated as navigable if commercial traffic could …

The Dialectic Of Obscenity, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Until the 1960s, pornography was obscene, and obscenity prosecutions were relatively common. And until the 1970s, obscenity prosecutions targeted art, as well as pornography. But today, obscenity prosecutions are rare and limited to the most extreme forms of pornography.

So why did obscenity largely disappear? The conventional history of obscenity is doctrinal, holding that the Supreme Court’s redefinition of obscenity in order to protect art inevitably required the protection of pornography as well. In other words, art and literature were the vanguard of pornography.

But the conventional history of obscenity is incomplete. While it accounts for the development of obscenity …

Post-Reform Medicaid Before The Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, Nicole Huberfeld

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The United States Supreme Court heard two Medicaid cases this term that raise major questions about the program and the tensions it creates between the federal and state governments. On October 3, 2011, the Court heard oral arguments in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, a dispute between California and its Medicaid providers regarding reimbursement cuts resulting from California's budget crisis. The Medicaid providers argued that the proposed cuts are so extreme as to violate federal law and thus the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Their contention hinged on the Equal Access Provision of the Medicaid …

Reconciling Chevron, Mead, And The Review Of Agency Discretion: Source Of Law And The Standards Of Judicial Review, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Although the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has been understood by many as defining the framework for judicial review of agency legal determinations, there have been longstanding questions about the application of the standards for reviewing administrative action. These questions have become more troublesome following the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corp. Mead established that Chevron review only applies when defined requirements are met and held that so-called Skidmore deference applies when Chevron deference does not apply. Surveying the aftermath of Mead and its effect on the …

The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, Mary J. Davis

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Is there or isn't there a “presumption against preemption”? The Supreme Court continues to mention it, but then does, or does not, apply it in a way that helps us understand what it is. This Article explores the Court's preemption opinions in the last several decades, particularly its most recent pronouncements, and concludes that, indeed, there is a presumption against preemption. It is a "new" presumption in the sense that it is born of the Court's active preemption docket in the last two decades, which has more narrowly defined both express and implied preemption analysis. The "new" presumption is stronger …

An Alternate Functionality Reality, Harold R. Weinberg

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Trade dress law does not protect the appearance of a product design feature (e.g., a product's configuration) against unauthorized copying if the feature is functional, but may protect the appearance if the feature is nonfunctional. The functionality doctrine is intended to preserve competition in the market for a product incorporating a design feature that allegedly is protected by trade dress law, and to avoid conflicts between trade dress law and patent law. The Supreme Court last addressed the functionality doctrine in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. The Court intended TrafFix to “choke off” anticompetitive trade dress “strike suits.” …

Conditional Spending And Compulsory Maternity, Nicole Huberfeld

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

More than forty-six million Americans are uninsured, and many more are seeking government assistance, which makes congressional spending for federal programs a significant issue. Federal funding often comes with prerequisites in the form of statutory conditions. This Article examines the impact that conditions placed on federal healthcare spending have on the individuals who rely on that spending by exploring the ongoing disconnect between Spending Clause jurisprudence and women's reproductive rights. The first Part reviews the foundational Supreme Court precedents and places them in context from both a statutory and theoretical perspective. The second Part studies what the author denominates "pure …

Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, And Medicaid Entitlements, Nicole Huberfeld

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The first two terms of the Roberts Court signal a willingness to revisit precedent, even decisions that have been considered long-settled, and the United States Supreme Court may be ready to reinterpret another area of jurisprudence: the private enforcement of conditions on federal spending against states through actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The most recent pre-Roberts Court precedent is Gonzaga University v. Doe, a 2002 decision that made it more difficult for individuals harmed by violations of federal laws to enforce rights through § 1983 actions. Federal courts have inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework, but the …

Nihilism With A Happy Ending? The Interstate Commerce Commission And The Emergence Of The Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, Mark F. Kightlinger

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This Article examines early Supreme Court opinions about the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—the first federal administrative agency—in an effort to identify the intellectual roots of the modern administrative state. The Article argues that the Court's effort to explain and justify the function of the newborn ICC shows the traces of a post-Enlightenment crisis in the field of moral philosophy—i.e., the growing conviction that it is no longer possible for reasonable people to agree on what constitutes a true, objective, universally valid standard of reasonable or just conduct. From this essentially nihilistic starting point, the Court helped to fashion a new …

The Peculiar Story Of United States V. Miller, Brian L. Frye

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

On April 18, 1938, the Arkansas and Oklahoma state police stopped Jack Miller and Frank Layton, two washed-up Oklahoma bank robbers. Miller and Layton had an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, so the police arrested them for violating the National Firearms Act (“NFA”). Surprisingly, the district court dismissed the charges, holding the NFA violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed in United States v. Miller, holding the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right to keep and bear a sawed-off shotgun as a matter of law.

Seventy years later, Miller remains the only Supreme Court opinion construing the Second Amendment. …

Florida East Coast Railway And The Structure Of Administrative Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

A typical Administrative Law course presents the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. as establishing the rule that statutory text quite close to the magic words, "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," is needed to trigger the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) formal hearing requirements for a rulemaking. Florida East Coast Railway is a prime example of an underrated case because, even though the case is well known, its renown is a consequence only of its black letter rule about rulemaking procedures. Many scholars and practitioners do not appreciate the case for …

Preemption Of State Tort Law By Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

This article shall attempt to trace the twists and turns of Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence. Part I provides a brief overview of federal preemption law, considering the constitutional sources of preemption and the traditional preemption categories. Part II analyzes Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the source of modem Supreme Court doctrine regarding preemption of state tort law by federal safety legislation. Part III reviews seven post-Cipollone Supreme Court preemption cases: CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, Geier v. American Honda Motor …

On Preemption, Congressional Intent, And Conflict Of Laws, Mary J. Davis

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Conflicts scholars and jurists for centuries have sought an answer to the question of "what law controls?" by balancing a number of considerations. Chief among those considerations are the legitimate political and policy concerns of conflicting sovereigns. This article analyzes the Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions with an understanding of these theories and their underlying considerations. That analysis reveals that the Court's recent preemption decisions incorporate two modem conflict of laws theories: Governmental Interest Analysis and its corollary, Comparative Impairment. Each of these theories builds on the notion that a choice of law analysis should be motivated by selecting the …

Resorting To External Norms And Principles In Constitutional Decision-Making, Alvin L. Goldman

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Given the very significant role of constitutional law in the American political system and the fact that Supreme Court Justices are appointed through a political process, it is understandable that the appropriate judicial approach to resolving constitutional issues often is the subject of political commentary. Unfortunately, discourse by politicians concerning this issue seldom rises to the deserved level of wisdom. One of President George W. Bush's public mantras is illustrative of political commentary respecting federal judicial appointments: "I'm going to put strict constructionists on the bench." On its face, and as understood by politically naive audiences, the statement appears to …

Unmasking The Presumption In Favor Of Preemption, Mary J. Davis

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

It is inescapable: there is a presumption in favor of preemption. Historically, the Supreme Court has said differently-that, rather, there is a presumption against preemption. There is no such presumption any longer, if, indeed, there ever really was one. Preemption doctrine has been exceedingly puzzling in the last decade, but when one recognizes that the Court's doctrine not only favors preemption, but presumes it, preemption doctrine is not a puzzle at all.

This Article argues that the Supreme Court's recent preemption decisions compel the conclusion that the Court's preemption analysis has, in effect, created a presumption in favor of preemption, …

Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead And The Shrinking Domain Of Statutory Ambiguity, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In skewering the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia's rhetoric is exceptional. He derides the decision as "one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad." Although Justice Scalia objects to Mead's new and uncertain limits on the applicability of the Chevron doctrine, this Article will focus instead on how Mead employs a method of interpretation imputing a clear intent to Congress, and authorizes courts to discern statutory meaning without strong deference to …

Communis Opinio And The Methods Of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law Or Changing Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Interpretive methodology lies at the core of the Supreme Court's persistent modern debate about statutory interpretation. Supreme Court Justices have applied two fundamentally different methods of interpretation. One is the formalist method, which seeks to promote rule-of-law values and purports to constrain the discretion of judges by limiting them to the autonomous legal text. The second is the nonformalist or antiformalist method, which may consider the legislature's intent or purpose or other evidence as context for understanding the statutory text. The debate within the current Court is commonly framed and advanced by Justices Stevens and Scalia. Justice Scalia is now …

Textualism’S Limits On The Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, And Chevron, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) does not have authority under the Clean Water Act (the Act or the CWA) to regulate the filling of “other waters.” This decision demonstrates a major shift in the Court's approach to statutory interpretation, particularly in the context of reviewing an agency’s understanding of a statute. The significance of the case is best gauged by contrasting it with United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. There, the Court, acting …