Law Commons^™

Senators Treat Female Supreme Court Nominees Differently. Here’S The Evidence., Lori A. Ringhand, Christina L. Boyd, Paul M. Collins, Jr.

Popular Media

Over the weekend, President Trump nominated Judge Amy Coney Barrett to fill the Supreme Court seat left empty by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s death. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has promised to move the nomination swiftly through to confirmation. As a result, the nation’s attention will soon turn to Barrett’s confirmation hearings in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Based on our empirical examinations of every question asked and every answer given at the hearings since the first in 1939, here is what to expect.

Interruptions At Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings Have Been Rising Since The 1980s, Paul M. Collins Jr., Lori A. Ringhand

Popular Media

As scholars of the confirmation process, we aim to measure what is measurable, in the hope that data can inform our more subjective perceptions of politics. And one measurable feature of Kavanaugh’s testimony is the striking number of times he interrupted the senators to challenge their comments or force his own point. Here, the historical record can shed some light. This article reviews the history of interruptions during Supreme Court confirmation hearings from 1939 to 2010.

The Filibuster And The Framing: Why The Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional And What To Do About It, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Senate’s handling of filibusters has changed dramatically in recent decades. As a result, the current sixty-vote requirement for invoking cloture of debate does not produce protracted speechmaking on the Senate floor, as did predecessors of this rule in earlier periods of our history. Rather, the upper chamber now functions under a “stealth filibuster” system that in practical effect requires action by a supermajority to pass proposed bills. This Article demonstrates why this system offends a constitutional mandate of legislative majoritarianism in light of well-established Framing-era understandings and governing substance-over-form principles of interpretation. Having established the presence of a …

Functioning Just Fine: The Unappreciated Value Of The Supreme Court Confirmation Process, Lori A. Ringhand, Paul M. Collins Jr.

Scholarly Works

Scholars, politicians, and legal commentators from across the ideological spectrum seem to agree that the U.S. Supreme Court confirmation process is broken and needs to be fixed. Reform proposals vary, but share a common assumption that if we do not do something the legitimacy of the Court will be at risk.

This Article presents an alternative view, arguing that the confirmation process is in fact functioning just fine. The way we confirm Supreme Court nominees today is not perfect, but nor is it all that bad. If there is a crisis facing the high Court today, it lies not in …

The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

Controversy over the Senate’s filibuster practice dominates modern discussion of American legislative government. With increasing frequency, commentators have urged that the upper chamber’s requirement of sixty votes to close debate on pending matters violates a majority-rulebased norm of constitutional law. Proponents of this view, however, tend to gloss over a more basic question: Does the Constitution’s Rules of Proceedings Clause permit the houses of Congress to adopt internal parliamentary requirements under which a bill is deemed “passed” only if it receives supermajority support? This question is important. Indeed, the House already has such a rule in place, and any challenge …

In Defense Of Ideology: A Principled Approach To The Supreme Court Confirmation Process, Lori A. Ringhand

Scholarly Works

In this paper, Professor Ringhand offers a principled defense of an ideological approach to the Supreme Court justice confirmation process. In constructing her argument, she does three things. First, she explores how the insights provided by recent empirical legal scholarship have created a need to re-think the role of the Supreme Court and, consequently, the process by which we select Supreme Court justices. In doing so, Professor Ringhand explains how these insights have called into question much of our conventional constitutional narrative, and how this failure of the conventional narrative has in turn undermined traditional objections to an ideologically-based confirmation …