Law Commons^™

Inactive Exercise & Unequal Protection: Espinoza & Carson Under The Equal Protection Clause, Griffith B. Bludworth

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Education, The First Amendment, And The Constitution, Erwin Chemerinsky

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

School Matters, Ronna Greff Schneider

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Life Begins: A Case Study Of The Unitarian Universalism Faith And Its Potential To Combat Anti-Abortion Legislation, Jennifer O'Rourke

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Revisiting Employment Division V. Smith, Blaine L. Hutchison

University of Cincinnati Law Review

The Supreme Court wrongly decided Employment Division v. Smith. Without briefing or argument over the Free Exercise Clause’s meaning, Smith eliminated the constitutional right to exercise religion and replaced it with an equal protection rule. The decision threatens religious freedom and encourages conflict. The Supreme Court should revisit Smith. This article shows that the majority’s arguments in Smith fail and contradict the Free Exercise Clause’s text, purpose, and original meaning.

The Smith majority gave no sound legal or policy reason for its decision. Indeed, the decision conflicted with settled precedents that no party questioned. Nor did it determine …

Core Freedoms In Nigerian And U.S. Constitutions: A Study In Difference, Gordon A. Christenson

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This article compares core freedoms in the United States Constitution with similar constitutional experience encountered in the Nigerian Constitution. It is a study in difference, illuminated by learned papers and discussion of these issues by judges, lawyers, professors, journalists and activists in Nigeria. Moreover, to add a third dimension, differences and similarities in constitutional experiences are shown within the contemporary framework of international norms.

Uncertainty In Law And Its Negation: Reflections, Gordon A. Christenson

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

For this issue of the Review, the editors invited me to reflection. In response, I wish to consider some aspects of a problem that has bothered me over the past quarter-century. This problem arises from radical subjectivism and its effect on the legal order. I believe that something is radically subjective in law when one norm is considered as valid as any other, or when one perception of facts is thought as valid as any other, for the reason that any objective principles for determining validity are either inadequate or considered meaningless tautologies, masking the subjective preference of those with …