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Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
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This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled.
The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate …
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
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This short piece takes a first step toward providing the empirical bases for an assessment of the benefits of private enforcement. It presents evidence showing that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest. Private enforcement helps compensate victimized consumers, and it also helps deter anticompetitive conduct. This piece demonstrates this by briefly summarizing a more detailed analysis of forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases.
To analyze these cases' compensation effects this presents, inter alia, the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was …