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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
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This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They …
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
What Do Exit Polls And Flu Vaccine Shortages Have In Common?, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande, F.M. Scherer
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What do exit polls and flu vaccine shortages have in common? Both involve situations where society has come to rely excessively on too few entities. When even one company makes a mistake society can suffer significantly. This short piece advocates that we abandon our almost laissez faire tolerence towards high concentration, and rely upon competition, rather than on monopoly or a small number of producers.
Choosing Among Antitrust Liability Standards Under Incomplete Information: Assessments Of And Aversions To The Risk Of Being Wrong, Barbara Ann White
Choosing Among Antitrust Liability Standards Under Incomplete Information: Assessments Of And Aversions To The Risk Of Being Wrong, Barbara Ann White
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This essay analyzes the three papers presented on a panel I organized as chair of the AALS Antitrust Section entitled Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Dominant Firms for the 2005 Annual Meetings. Steve Salop’s and Doug Melamed’s papers recommend standards for government intervention while David McGowan argues why the government should not.
I create a framework within which to understand the three papers’ relationship to each other, by building on McGowan’s characterization of courts’ antitrust decisions. Since antitrust decisions are based on inherently incomplete real world information, they are subject to “error costs”: Courts are at risk of “false positives” (finding …