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Who Will Protect The Consumers Of Trademarked Goods?, James Astrachan May 2017

Who Will Protect The Consumers Of Trademarked Goods?, James Astrachan

University of Baltimore Law Review

Federal and state law recognizes multiple forms of intellectual property, including patents,1 copyrights,2 trademarks,3 and trade secrets.4 Alleged violations of patents and copyrights are required by statute to be litigated in the federal courts.5 Trademark rights can arise under the Federal Lanham Act6 or state law.7 Trademark infringement can be litigated in state or federal courts.8 Trade secrets arising under state statutes are litigated in state courts unless diversity jurisdiction exists and is pled.9

Infringement of intellectual property in the case of patents arises when a patented invention is used, manufactured or ...


Sacred Cows, Holy Wars: Exploring The Limits Of Law In The Regulation Of Raw Milk And Kosher Meat, Kenneth Lasson Oct 2014

Sacred Cows, Holy Wars: Exploring The Limits Of Law In The Regulation Of Raw Milk And Kosher Meat, Kenneth Lasson

All Faculty Scholarship

In a free society law and religion seldom coincide comfortably, tending instead to reflect the inherent tension that often resides between the two. This is nowhere more apparent than in America, where the underlying principle upon which the first freedom enunciated by the Constitution's Bill of Rights is based ‒ the separation of church and state – is conceptually at odds with the pragmatic compromises that may be reached. But our adherence to the primacy of individual rights and civil liberties ‒ that any activity must be permitted if it is not imposed upon others without their consent, and if it does ...


Should Section 5 Guidelines Focus On Economic Efficiency Or Consumer Choice?, Robert H. Lande May 2014

Should Section 5 Guidelines Focus On Economic Efficiency Or Consumer Choice?, Robert H. Lande

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FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright is right that it would be desirable for the Commission to issue Section 5 antitrust guidelines. This article will demonstrate, however, that the best way to formulate Section 5 guidelines is to focus them on the goal of protecting consumer choice, rather than to embrace Commissioner Wright's proposal to neuter the FTC Act by confining it in an economic efficiency straitjacket. Only if Section 5 guidelines were formulated appropriately would they improve consumer welfare during the Commission's second century.


A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande Apr 2013

A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or "plain meaning" analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice Scalia's methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law cases, and the earliest U.s. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the history of the relevant times ...


Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Dec 2012

Cartels As Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled.

The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate ...


How The Ftc Could Beat Google, Robert H. Lande, Jonathan L. Rubin Oct 2012

How The Ftc Could Beat Google, Robert H. Lande, Jonathan L. Rubin

All Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission is rumored to be deciding whether to bring a “pure Section 5” case against Google as a result of complaints that the company unfairly favors its own offerings over those of its rivals in its search results. But the case will fail miserably at the hands of a reviewing court and the agency will be confined to relatively non-controversial enforcement violations if the FTC fails to impose upon itself a tightly bounded and constrained legal framework that contains clear limiting principles. The only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure ...


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Aug 2012

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is both a short introduction to the Consumer Choice explanation for Competition Law or Antitrust Law, and also a short advocacy piece suggesting that Consumer Choice is the best way to articulate the goals of European Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law.

This article briefly:

  1. defines the consumer choice approach to antitrust or competition law and shows how it differs from other approaches;
  2. shows that the antitrust statutes and theories of violation embody a concern for optimal levels of consumer choice;
  3. shows that the United States antitrust case law embodies a concern for optimal levels of consumer ...


Comments: The Credit Card Act Of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National Usury Rate Would Provide Consumers With The Protection They Need, Eliot C. Schaefer Jan 2012

Comments: The Credit Card Act Of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National Usury Rate Would Provide Consumers With The Protection They Need, Eliot C. Schaefer

University of Baltimore Law Review

No abstract provided.


As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft Is Victorious In Defeat, Norman Hawker, Robert H. Lande May 2011

As Antitrust Case Ends, Microsoft Is Victorious In Defeat, Norman Hawker, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the final judgment in the celebrated Microsoft case ends, this piece very briefly assesses the impact of its remedy. When evaluated in terms of its most important goals, the remedy has proven to be a failure. Microsoft's monopoly power in the PC operating systems market is now as great as it was when the case was brought in 1998 or the remedy was ordered in 2002. The article also very briefly discusses the implications of this remedy for Google and AT&T.


"Consumer Choice" Is Where We Are All Going - So Let's Go Together, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande, Paul Nihoul Jan 2011

"Consumer Choice" Is Where We Are All Going - So Let's Go Together, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande, Paul Nihoul

All Faculty Scholarship

Globalisation of business makes it important for firms to predict how their behaviour is likely to be treated in the roughly 200 nations that have competition laws. In that context, a crucial question is: are we in a position to develop a common intellectual framework that would give coherence to policy statements made on specific competition related issues and, at the same time, be acceptable, broadly, in a variety of legal systems, not necessarily based on identical assumptions? We believe that the answer is “yes.” A concept is emerging as a possible source of unification for competition policies around the ...


Overcoming Under-Compensation And Under-Deterrence In Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages The Best Remedy?, Stephen J. Shapiro Jan 2011

Overcoming Under-Compensation And Under-Deterrence In Intentional Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages The Best Remedy?, Stephen J. Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article advocates that states' statutes make greater and more systematic use of multiple damages by extending them to a much broader range of intentional, wrongful conduct. Part II of this Article will explain why extra-compensatory relief is called for when tortious conduct is intentional or malicious. Part III will compare punitive damages, attorney fees, and treble or other multiple damages as possible sources of additional relief. Part IV will focus on multiple damages. The Article will examine the range of existing state statutes and discuss why and how those statutes might be extended to a broader range of wrongful ...


The Intel And Microsoft Settlements, Robert H. Lande Sep 2010

The Intel And Microsoft Settlements, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article briefly compares and contrasts the recent U.S. Federal Trade Commission's antitrust settlement with Intel, and the antitrust cases brought against Microsoft. The article praises the FTC's settlement with Intel, and predicts that history will judge it very favorably compared to the settlement by the U.S. Department of Justice of its antitrust case against Microsoft.


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Jan 2010

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Recenter The Mission Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article will (1) define the consumer choice approach to competition law or antitrust law and show how it differs from other approaches; (2) discuss the types of situations where a consumer choice focus is likely to make a difference in enforcement outcomes, producing better results than the other paradigms; (3) show that another important advantage of using the consumer choice approach would be to nudge decisions in the right direction; and (4) offer a brief overview of implementation issues.

This is a chapter of a forthcoming ASCOLA book, and is a condensation and update of Neil W. Averitt & Robert ...


The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande Jun 2009

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

  1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
  2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
  3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
  4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in ...


Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande Feb 2009

Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.

Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline and constraints ...


The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande Nov 2008

The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community is that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That view is incorrect. As this article shows, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This article defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, analyzes recent case law in more depth than any prior article, and explores the most likely bases for current popular support of the antitrust laws. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that ...


Step Right Up: Using Consumer Decision Making Theory To Teach Research Process In The Electronic Age, Amy E. Sloan Oct 2008

Step Right Up: Using Consumer Decision Making Theory To Teach Research Process In The Electronic Age, Amy E. Sloan

All Faculty Scholarship

The legal academy has framed legal research as a professional skill, and much research pedagogy centers around replicating a controlled professional environment to allow students to learn how to do research by simulating legal practice. Although this is a valid way to conceptualize research, it is not the only way. Another way to conceptualize research is as a consumer transaction. Legal information is, in many ways, a product that information providers market to lawyers and students, as the promotions and contests that LexisNexis and Westlaw sponsor demonstrate. Once legal information is understood as a product, the process of research can ...


Is Europe Unfairly Attacking Another U.S. High Technology Company?, Robert H. Lande Sep 2008

Is Europe Unfairly Attacking Another U.S. High Technology Company?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece considers whether the EU antitrust action against Intel constitutes an example of European regulators attacking a successful US company in order to protect a European competitor, or whether it instead is an example of legitimate law enforcement.


The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy Is An Antitrust Concern, Robert H. Lande Feb 2008

The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy Is An Antitrust Concern, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Privacy and antitrust? Isn't antitrust only supposed to be concerned with price? Well, no. Antitrust is actually about consumer choice, and price is only one type of choice. The ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws is to help ensure that the free market will bring to consumers everything they want from competition. This starts with competitive prices, of course, but consumers also want an optimal level of variety, innovation, quality, and other forms of non-price competition. Including, in the Google-Doubleclick and Microsoft-Yahoo transactions, privacy protection.


The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande Jan 2008

The Chicago School's Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust Protects Consumers, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

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Chicago School antitrust policy rests on the premise that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That foundation is flawed. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This essay defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, and analyzes recent case law. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that deprives them of the benefits of competition and transfers their wealth to firms with market power. When conduct presents a conflict between the welfare ...


Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2008

Cartel Overcharges And Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a U.S. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of ...


Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande Sep 2007

Intel's Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This short piece explains how the first unit discounts or rebates allegedly given by Intel on their X86 chips could harm competition, innovation, and PC purchasers in this crucial $33 billion/year market. For these reasons, their discounts or rebates could violate European Competition law and U.S. Antitrust law.


Comments: Restitution In Consumer Protection Actions: Stop The Reliance On Reliance, Lisa Yurwit Jan 2007

Comments: Restitution In Consumer Protection Actions: Stop The Reliance On Reliance, Lisa Yurwit

University of Baltimore Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which ...


Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity ...


Choosing Among Antitrust Liability Standards Under Incomplete Information: Assessments Of And Aversions To The Risk Of Being Wrong, Barbara Ann White Jan 2005

Choosing Among Antitrust Liability Standards Under Incomplete Information: Assessments Of And Aversions To The Risk Of Being Wrong, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay analyzes the three papers presented on a panel I organized as chair of the AALS Antitrust Section entitled Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Dominant Firms for the 2005 Annual Meetings. Steve Salop’s and Doug Melamed’s papers recommend standards for government intervention while David McGowan argues why the government should not.

I create a framework within which to understand the three papers’ relationship to each other, by building on McGowan’s characterization of courts’ antitrust decisions. Since antitrust decisions are based on inherently incomplete real world information, they are subject to “error costs”: Courts are at risk of ...


Beware Buyer Power, Robert H. Lande Jul 2004

Beware Buyer Power, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The conventional antitrust wisdom is that buyer side market power or monopsony is so unusual and so rarely anticompetitive that it should not merit more than a scholarly afterthought. Moreover, these brief mentions typically say it is essentially the mirror image of seller power or that, while seller-side power is suspect since it leads to higher consumer prices, buyer-side power is usually benign, because the public should not care which layer of a distribution channel gets any potential savings that can arise. This short article discusses how buyer power can be anticompetitive. It also discusses how buyer power or monopsony ...


Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande Jun 2003

Ub Viewpoint – Aol/Microsoft Settlement Could Harm Consumers, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The European Union’S Microsoft Case: No Time For Jingoism, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande Apr 2003

The European Union’S Microsoft Case: No Time For Jingoism, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Ub Viewpoint – Media Mergers, Antitrust Law And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande Mar 2003

Ub Viewpoint – Media Mergers, Antitrust Law And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.