Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Airbnb

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Pluralism And Regulatory Response To The Sharing Economy, Erez Aloni Jan 2018

Pluralism And Regulatory Response To The Sharing Economy, Erez Aloni

All Faculty Publications

Providers use platforms in dissimilar ways. Some providers create new capacity and designate it for exclusively commercial use via platforms. For example, a provider buys a car that serves predominantly for driving paying passengers, converts a standard residential rental to a short-term rental, or works full-time via a platform. Conversely, other providers leverage their idle capacity and monetize it (e.g., a provider uses the family car to drive platform passengers in the evenings). This chapter argues that the distinction between new and idle capacity is a fundamental concept that should guide regulation of activities in the platform economy. Creating new …


Capturing Excess In The On-Demand Economy, Erez Aloni Jan 2017

Capturing Excess In The On-Demand Economy, Erez Aloni

All Faculty Publications

Activities facilitated by on-demand platforms (such as Airbnb or Uber) produce varying levels of negative and positive externalities. In this Article I submit that the type and quantity of externalities produced are determined by the location of the activity along a spectrum of increased utilization. Transactions that make use of excess capacity produce the fewest negative externalities and produce more positive externalities. The more we move along the spectrum away from use of excess capacity and toward new capacity created for the platform use, the more negative externalities the activity produces. Thus, unique sets of rules should govern the categories …


Pluralizing The 'Sharing' Economy, Erez Aloni Jan 2016

Pluralizing The 'Sharing' Economy, Erez Aloni

All Faculty Publications

The so-called sharing economy presents one of the most important and controversial regulatory dilemmas of our time — yet, surprisingly, it remains undertheorized. This Article supplies needed analysis. Specifically, the Article offers a regulatory model that distinguishes between two separate kinds of transactions: conventional economic transactions and those that rely on temporary access to goods and services that would otherwise go underutilized (what I call “access-to-excess” transactions). The regulatory regime that this Article proposes would distinguish between true access-to-excess transactions and conventional transactions. The model is rooted in a version of pluralist theory that posits that the state is responsible …